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Abstract
The primary objective of this paper is to present the de.nition of a new dynamic, linear
and modal logic for security protocols. The logic is compact, expressive and formal. It allows
the speci.cation of classical security properties (authentication, secrecy and integrity) and also
electronic commerce properties (non-repudiation, anonymity, good atomicity, money atomicity,
certi.ed delivery, etc.). The logic constructs are interpreted over a trace-based model. Traces
re2ect valid protocol executions in the presence of a malicious smart intruder. The logic is
endowed with a tableau-based proof system that leads to a modular denotational semantics and
local model checking.
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1. Motivations and background
Security is becoming an increasingly important issue in computing, due to the in-
credible expansion of concurrent and distributed systems such as databases, worldwide
web, electronic mail and commerce, etc. In such contexts, information must be pro-
tected against mysti.cation, destruction and disclosure. Accordingly, a great deal of
interest has been expressed in the development and use of cryptographic protocols.
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Cryptography is the science of securing information. It is based on a set of tech-
niques which involve a transformation from clear or intelligible text to an encrypted or
ciphered text. The process of transforming a clear text into an encrypted one is called
encryption or encipherment. The reverse process is called decryption or decipherment.
The science that has opposite objectives to cryptography is called cryptanalysis. In
other words, cryptanalysis aims at breaking down encrypted messages so as to get
their corresponding clear texts. The basic operations in cryptography are encryption
and decryption. These two functions are generally given within a cryptographic system
(or cryptosystem). In the literature, there are two kinds of cryptosystems: symmetric
and asymmetric. Symmetric cryptosystems use the same key (the secret key) to encrypt
and decrypt messages, while asymmetric cryptosystems use one key (the public key)
to encrypt messages and a diKerent key (the private key) to decrypt them. Asymmetric
cryptosystems are also called public key cryptosystems.
A protocol is an orderly de.ned sequence of communication and computation steps.
A communication step transfers messages from one principal (sender) to another
(receiver), while a computation step updates a principal’s internal state. A protocol
based on cryptography is called a cryptographic protocol. Cryptographic functions are
used to achieve security objectives. In the literature, two major classes of cryptographic
protocols have been proposed: authentication protocols and key distribution protocols.
The primary objective of authentication protocols is to allow principals to identify
themselves to each other. Key distribution protocols aim at distributing cryptographic
keys between principals.
Furthermore, institutions that use electronic commerce need to enforce special and
additional security properties to warranty the validity of transactions. For instance,
e-commerce protocols should ensure money atomicity, i.e., there is no creation nor
destruction of money that result from electronic transactions. Both the customer and the
merchant must be able to exhibit a proof of the content of the delivered goods (certi.ed
delivery). Some people must be allowed to keep secret their identity (anonymity). It
should be impossible for a principal that has been involved in a protocol run to deny
having participated in all or part of the underlying communications (non-repudiation).
The design of cryptographic protocols is hard and extremely complicated. Indeed, if
the protocol is not designed carefully enough, it may contain 2aws, which can be the
ideal starting point for various attacks. In such a context, it is not surprising that there
have been several examples of cryptographic protocols that were published, believed
to be sound, and later shown to have several security 2aws. It is well known now that
the informal design of cryptographic protocols is error prone. Instead, formal methods
seem to be better suited for solving the problem. Application of formal methods for
cryptographic protocols did not become widespread until the early 1990’s. Indeed, the
search of not yet discovered security 2aws in cryptographic protocols stimulates the
use of formal analysis techniques. This fact increasingly prompted research into the
development of several diKerent formal methods for detecting protocol 2aws.
The main intent of this work is to present the de.nition of a new logic for security
protocols. The logic is compact, expressive and formal. It allows the speci.cation of
classical security properties (authentication, secrecy and integrity) and also electronic
commerce properties (non-repudiation, anonymity, good atomicity, money atomicity,
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certi.ed delivery, etc.). The logic constructs are interpreted over a trace-based model.
Traces re2ect valid protocol executions in the presence of a malicious smart intruder.
Also, we present a tableau-based proof system for our logic with the aim to perform
local model-checking. The tableau proof system is proven to be .nite, sound and
complete.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present an overview of related
work in the area of modeling and veri.cation of cryptographic protocols. Section 3
proposes a notation for specifying security protocols including their internal actions.
Section 4 gives a trace-based model for the logic. Section 5 introduces the syntax of our
logic. Section 6 gives the denotational semantics associated with the logic. Section 7 is
devoted to the tableau-based proof system of the logic. The .niteness, the soundness
and the completeness of the tableau will be proved. Section 9 discusses some security
properties and their speci.cation within the proposed logic. Finally, Section 10 gives
some concluding remarks.
2. Related work
Formal modeling and veri.cation of security protocols have received much attention
in recent years. Several methods for the description and analysis of cryptographic
protocols have been proposed. In [10–12,28,30,37,46,51,52], we can .nd a complete
bibliography and a comparative study. These methods can be classi.ed into logical
methods, general purpose formal methods and process algebra methods.
Typically, logical methods rest on the use of modal (epistemic, temporal and=or
doxatic) logics. The logic is used to specify the protocol (idealization) as well as the
security properties. One of the .rst signi.cant attempts at the speci.cation of security
protocols and properties is the BAN logic [9,8]. Proved to be useful for the analysis of
authentication protocols, the BAN logic has stimulated the development of many other
security logics (CKT5, GNY, KPL, etc.) [3,13,21,23,35]. These logics are generally
based on the evolution of belief and=or knowledge of principals involved in a given
protocol run. Though these logics are known to be adequate for the speci.cation of
the classical security properties such as authentication and secrecy, they fail to natu-
rally capture many electronic commerce properties such as good and money atomicity.
The speci.cation of these properties goes, indeed, beyond a simple belief or knowl-
edge manipulation. For instance, the money atomicity property states that there is no
money creation or destruction within any protocol run. Actually, money transfer, from
the customer account to the merchant account, is generally performed by some inter-
nal actions (debit=credit) implemented within electronic commerce protocols. However,
these internal actions are not taken into consideration by these logics. As a result, the
speci.cation and the analysis of the money atomicity property, for instance, is very
diRcult if not impossible within these logics.
The classical security logics (BAN, AT, GNY, CKT5, etc.) are generally used to
specify both security protocols and security properties. However, the practice of using
the same logic in specifying both security protocols and their properties is questionable.
Indeed, a logic could be very expressive when specifying the security protocols, but
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less expressive when specifying the security requirements and vice versa. Therefore, it
would be more bene.cial and powerful to have a modular environment separating the
speci.cation of the security protocols from the speci.cation of their security properties.
For instance, within the process algebra approaches, one can use the most suitable
calculus (CCS, CSP, -calculus, etc.) to specify a system and the most appropriate
logic (CTL, LTL or the -calculus) to specify a property. Hence, proposing a formal
and expressive language dedicated to the speci.cation of the security requirements is
obviously essential.
Some eKorts have been devoted during the last years to developing logics for the
speci.cation of security requirements [13,53]. However, a powerful language dedicated
to the speci.cation of both classical security properties (authentication, con.dentiality
and secrecy) and electronic commerce properties (good atomicity, money atomicity,
etc.) still does not exist. The misunderstanding of the meaning of the correctness of
security protocols and the existence of many diKerent de.nitions associated to the same
security properties explains the absence of such a language.
Another trend in formal veri.cation of cryptographic protocols consists in the
accommodation of some well known general-purpose formal methods for the veri-
.cation of cryptographic protocols. Representative speci.cation languages that have
been used in such accommodations are LOTOS [7,56,58], B, VDM [4,56], HOL [50],
Ina Jo [27,28], Z [6,49] and Coq [5]. Although these formal methods are now .rmly
established and known to be of great use in speci.cation and veri.cation, they are not
dedicated to cryptographic protocols. In addition, these methods need much of expert
assistance during the veri.cation process. In fact, they rely on manual or interactive
theorem proving techniques.
Lately, the use of process algebra for cryptographic protocols speci.cation and ver-
i.cation has been explored. In 1995, Lowe [31,32] was the .rst to use CSP [25] and
model-checking techniques for cryptographic protocol analysis. The protocol is spec-
i.ed as a set of communicating sequential processes that are running in parallel and
interacting with their surroundings. The veri.cation is performed by extracting a model
(usually a .nite state transition system) from the speci.cation and checking the model
against a logical speci.cation (a formula over a modal temporal logic) or a behav-
ioral speci.cation (a process term). A similar approach was developed by Roscoe,
Gardiner, Jackson and Hulance in [19,20,45] and Schneider in [47]. Recently, Abadi
and Gordon [1,2] proposed Spi, a calculus for cryptographic protocols. Spi is built on
top of the -calculus [38,39,40], a mobile process algebra. It has been devised for the
description and analysis of security protocols. In [41,42,48] Mitchell et al. presented
a new methodology for automatic cryptoprotocol analysis using the general-purpose
state enumeration tool Mur [16]. The idea is to verify whether an intruder could lead
the principals involved in a protocol run to an insecure state. Many other approaches
[26,37,54] are based on the Dolev–Yao model [17] that consider protocols from the
attacker’s standpoint.
The process-algebra-based methods have been successfully used in the detection of
several 2aws in well-known cryptographic protocols. The approach seems to be very
promising and useful. However, it is well known that the underlying veri.cation tech-
niques, mainly those based on model-checking, are problematic in the presence of
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processes that exhibit in.nite behaviors. Accordingly, the in.nite aspects of crypto-
graphic protocols are usually not supported in the veri.cation process. Notice also that
the speci.cation of security properties in terms of process agents or modal formulas is
neither straightforward nor systematic.
3. Protocol specication
Our concern in this section is to give a simple and intuitive representation of proto-
cols that take into account all the information needed to perform their analysis.
3.1. Message syntax
First, we need to de.ne the message syntax. It is captured by the following BNF
grammar:
m ::= A Principal Identifier
| cte Constant Message
| {m}m′ Encrypted Message
| m;m′ Message Concatenation
| f(m) Function Application
We will use capital letters of the form A, B, etc., to denote principals. All messages
that keep constant their values along a given protocol run are considered as constants
and will be abstracted to terms of the form cte. A constant message could be a simple
text or a number. For instance, in electronic commerce protocols, descriptions of goods
are simple texts. A message m encrypted with key m′ is written {m}m′ and forms a
message by itself. Commas separate concatenated messages. All non-constant messages
will be represented as terms through functional application. For example, a fresh nonce
N , created by a principal A in a protocol run , is represented by the term N (A; )
and a client credit card number could be represented by the term cc(A; B), where A
is the client and B is the bank. For convenience, messages may be annotated. We use
superscript annotations to indicate run identi.ers and subscript annotations to indicate
the principal association. Accordingly, the term N (A; ) will be simply represented as
NA . If in some context more than one nonce are needed within the same session, they
will be represented by, N1(A; ), N2(A; ), etc.
3.2. Action set
We classify protocol actions into two categories: external and internal actions, as
follows:
• External actions or communication actions consist of send and receive actions. We
will write :i ABB :m to denote a send operation in which a principal A transmits
a message m over the network, intentionally to a principal B, at step i of session
. We will write :i ACB :m to denote a receive operation in which a principal A
gets a message m from the network, intentionally from a principal B, at step i of
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session . The set of all external actions (send and receive actions) will be denoted
by EAct.
• Internal actions denote computation steps. We will write
:i act name(m1; : : : ; mn)
to denote a computation step performed at step i of session . It consists of the
invocation of the function act name over the parameters m1; : : : ; mn. The set of all
internal actions will be denoted by IAct.
The set of all external and internal actions will be denoted by Act. Actually, we have
Act = EAct ∪IAct:
3.3. Protocol
Now, let us introduce the syntax of protocol speci.cations. To cope with electronic
commerce protocols, we need to make the internal actions part of the speci.cation.
Suppose, for example, that we have a protocol that allows a principal C (customer)
to purchase goods from a vendor M (merchant) that will be paid through a trusted
bank B. Somewhere in the protocol, the bank debits the customer account and credits
the vendor account. The money atomicity property states that the amount debited from
the customer account has to be the same as the amount credited to the vendor. More
formally, we can say that: If :i debit(B; C; x) then :i credit(B;M; x). Here is the
formal de.nition of a protocol speci.cation.
Denition 1 (Protocol). A protocol is a .nite sequence of statements of the form


:i Act1(m11; : : : ; m
1
p)
: : :
:i Actq(m
q
1; : : : ; m
q
r )


:i A B B : m
:i B C A : m

:i Act′1(n
1
1; : : : ; n
1
p′)
: : :
:i Act′q(n
q′
1 ; : : : ; n
q′
r′ )


which state that, at a protocol step i, the actions
Act1(m11; : : : ; m
1
p); : : : ;Actq(m
q
1; : : : ; m
q
r )
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are performed after which the message m is transmitted from agent A to agent B. Once
the message m is received, the internal actions
Act′1(n
1
1; : : : ; n
1
p′); : : : ;Act
′
q(n
q′
1 ; : : : ; n
q′
r′ )
will be executed. The terms mji and n
j
i are messages.
The execution of a cryptoprotocol generates a sequence of events. Each event results
from the execution of a protocol step corresponding to a (possibly empty) sequence of
internal actions immediately followed by a send action or a receive action immediately
followed by a (possibly empty) sequence of internal actions.
For convenience and complying with the standard notion used in cryptoprotocol lit-
erature, the actions of the form (:j; ABB :m) and (:j; ACB :m) will be represented
respectively by (:j; I(A)→B :m) and (:j; I(B)→A :m). Moreover, we will write
:i A→B :m as an abbreviation for :i ABB :m followed by :i BCA :m. The initial
knowledge of each agent occurring in the trace is made explicit and represented by
special communication steps called “magic” steps. We arrange to deliver in a magic
way to each agent its initial knowledge thanks to these steps. We denote such step
by (:0; AC :m) where the sender is abstracted to the “ ” symbol and “0” as a step
identi.er. This encoding does not aKect the expressiveness of the speci.cation (at the
protocol or property level). However, it has the advantage to allow more compact and
uniform logic constructs.
Actions are abstracted to their names and their parameters. Furthermore, the user
does not need to specify all actions supposed to be performed at a given protocol step.
Only those actions that are relevant from the security standpoint will be reported in a
protocol speci.cation. To illustrate this, let us consider the following protocol P:
:1 Generate(A; Na )
:1 A → B : Na
:1 Generate(B;mb)
:1 Concatenate(B; Na ; m

b)
:1 Encrypt(B; (Na ; m

b); Kab)
:2 B → A : {Na ; mb}Kab
:2 Dencrypt(A; {Na ; mb}Kab ; Kab)
:2 Extract(A; Na ; m

b; (N

a ; m

b))
:2 Verify(A; Na )
:2 Debit(A; B; mb)
Suppose that only the internal action :2 Debit(A; B; mb) is critical from the security
standpoint. Then, the protocol could be simply speci.ed by
:1 A → B : Na
:2 B → A : {Na ; mb}Kab
:2 Debit(A; B; mb)
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A protocol is a distributed algorithm. A run is a particular execution of the protocol.
We refer to a protocol run as a session. The execution of a protocol is based on an
interleaving model in which all events, including concurrent events, occurring during
a run are interleaved to form a single trace of that execution. A session executed
in the presence of no intruders, is called a hand-to-hand session (as if messages are
exchanged from one hand to another without transiting through a hostile network).
Hand-to-hand sessions are meant to reason about a given protocol run. In fact, almost
all security properties amount to comparisons between hand-to-hand runs and real runs,
i.e., runs in the presence of an intruder. A hand-to-hand session is completely de.ned
by .xing principals and the session identi.er. For example, let P be the following
protocol:
:1 A → B : Na
:2 B → A : {Na ; mb}Kab
:2 Debit(A; B; mb)
Now, if we aim at analyzing a hand-to-hand session  in which a principal C playing
the role of A and a principal D playing the role of B, then we have only to compute
P , where  is the following substitution:  = {(A →C); (B →D); ( → )}. Therefore,
the hand-to-hand session  will be
:1 C → D : Nc
:2 D → C : {Nc ; md}Kcd
:2 Debit(C;D;md)
4. Trace-based model
Our intention is to specify security properties and to check them against protocol
models that abstract dynamic executions of security protocols. We will adopt a trace-
based model. The motivation underlying such a choice is three-fold: First, traces con-
stitute the simplest and most natural execution model considered so far in the security
literature. Second, a security 2aw in a cryptoprotocol is usually represented as a trace
that violates a security property. Third, there are many automatic trace generators that
have been proposed in the security literature. Hence, it is natural to check a security
property against a trace that re2ects a valid run of the protocol.
A trace is said to be valid if all the messages sent by the intruder could be derived
from the intruder’s cumulated knowledge (initial knowledge and received messages),
and all the involved principals respect the protocol. We assume that the network is
under the control of a malicious smart intruder. All the messages, sent or received by
honest principals, transit by the intruder. This is to capture the fact that the intruder
is aware of any message circulating over the network. Moreover, we assume that
the intruder is able to perform the following actions: overhear messages, intercept
messages, replay messages and generate new messages using his initial knowledge and
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Table 1
The Woo and Lam authentication protocol
Message .1. A → B : A
Message .2. B → A : Nb
Message .3. A → B : {Nb }Kas
Message .4. B → S : {A; {Nb }Kas}Kbs
Message .5. S → B : {Nb }Kbs
the overheard messages. In the following, we introduce formally the notion of protocol
traces. A protocol trace is a sequence of protocol events resulting from any interleaving
of (possibly partial) protocol runs. We have no restrictions on traces in the sense that
we support multi-session (an agent could participate in many sessions) and multi-role
(an agent can be an initiator in some sessions and responder in others).
Denition 2 (Protocol Traces). A trace is a sequence of events. The set T of traces
is de.ned inductively as follows:
• #∈T,
• if t ∈T and a is an event then t:a∈T,
where # stands for the empty trace and “.” is the concatenation operator for sequences.
A protocol can then be modeled as a subset of traces P⊆T. More formally, follow-
ing [43], we describe the set of protocol traces P as the closure of a set of inductive
rules. In this approach, a cryptoprotocol is modeled by a set of rules representing pro-
tocol steps and intruder capabilities. To give an example of such a modeling, consider
a version of the Woo and Lam authentication protocol [59]. The goal of this protocol
is to authenticate the identity of the principal A with respect to the principal B. To
achieve this objective, the protocol uses an authentication server S. The speci.cation
of this protocol is given in Table 1. Here, Kas is a key shared between A and S and
Kbs is a key shared between B and S. The message Nb is a nonce generated by B
during the session . It is used by B to preclude the replay of messages coming from
preceding sessions.
The Woo and Lam protocol traces P are built up inductively by a set of rules shown
in Table 2.
The inductive de.nition starts with the empty rule. The empty trace belongs always
to P. For each protocol step, we have a corresponding rule. For example, in the rule
Message 2, a trace t ∈P can be extended with the event (:j; BBA :Nb ) whenever
Nb is a fresh nonce, i.e., it has not been used in t. The rule Receive states that
a principal can get a message only if it has been previously sent to her. The rule
Intruder models the capacity of the intruder to send any message built up from the
past traRc.
The intruder closure operation ⇓ allows us to capture the usual intruder capabili-
ties: encryption, decryption, messages concatenation and message decomposition. It is
de.ned as the smallest set obtained by applying the rules given in Table 3.
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Table 2
Woo and Lam inductive rules
empty
# ∈ P
Receive
t ∈ P (:j; A B B : m) ∈ Vt
t: (:j; B C A : m) ∈ P
Intruder
t ∈ P m ∈ Message(t)⇓
t: (:j; A C B : m) ∈ P
Message 1
t ∈ P
t: (:j; A B B : A) ∈ P
Message 2
t ∈ P Nb =∈ Message(t)⇓
t: (:j; B B A : Nb ) ∈ P
Message 3
t ∈ P (:j; A C B : Nb ) ∈ Vt
t: (:j; A B B : {Nb }Kas ) ∈ P
Message 4
t ∈ P (:j; B C A : A) ∈ Vt (:j; B C A : {Nb }Kas ) ∈ Vt
t: (:j; B B S : {A; {Nb }Kas}Kbs ) ∈ P
Message 5
t ∈ P (S C B : {A; {Nb }Kas}Kbs ) ∈ Vt
t: (:j; S B B : {Nb }Kbs ) ∈ P
where
Message(t) is the set of messages in the trace t
Vt is the set of components in the sequence t
Table 3
Intruder closure operation
init
M ⊆ M⇓
decrypt
K ∈ M⇓ {m}K ∈ M⇓
m ∈ M⇓
encrypt
K ∈ M⇓ m ∈ M⇓
{m}K ∈ M⇓
compose
m ∈ M⇓ m′ ∈ M⇓
(m;m′) ∈ M⇓
decompose
(m1; m2) ∈ M⇓
mi ∈ M⇓
i = 1; 2
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5. Syntax of the logic
In order to be able to express a large variety of security properties, the proposed
logic has to be endowed with several features such as:
• Modalities: The logic should support modalities such as before, after, possible, nec-
essary, etc. These modalities are, indeed, very useful to specify security properties.
The authentication property, for instance, requires that a message received by a
honest principal has to have been previously sent by a honest principal in the same
protocol run, otherwise there is an authentication 2aw.
• Linearity: We give to the logic the possibility to consume resources. This property is
fundamental to specify many electronic commerce properties and it is not supported
by most classical logics. Within .rst-order logic, for example, one can use the
following Modus Ponens rule:
a a→ b
a b
This rule states that if we have a and a implies b then we can deduce b without
losing a. When used to reason about money and goods, this rule may lead to some
serious problems. Suppose, for instance, that a denotes money and b denotes goods
(butter). The Modus Ponens rule states that if we have money and this money allows
us to buy some goods (butter), then we can have both the goods and the money
at the same time. In other words, this means that you can have the butter and the
money from the butter!
• Recursive formulas: As we shall see later, recursive formulas together with linearity
allow us to count actions in a trace. Actually, the money atomicity property states
that there is no money creation or destruction within any protocol run. This property
is generally veri.ed by checking whether the number of the debit actions is equal
to the number of the credit ones. This counting could be stated as follows: If an
action debit exists in a trace, then an action credit must also exist in the same
trace. Moreover, if we consume one occurrence of each of these two actions (one
debit action and one credit action) from the trace (linearity), the modi.ed trace
still satis.es the property (recursive). Notice that recursive formulas are generally
captured using .xed-point operators.
The syntax of the logic is based on patterns that are sequences of actions and pattern
variables. More formally, a pattern is de.ned by the following grammar:
p := a:p | x:p | #
where # stands for the empty pattern, a is an action and x is a pattern variable.
Actions themselves may contain variables. For instance, the action (1:i credit(B;M; xm))
contains the variable x.
In the sequel, we denote the set of action variables by Va, the set of pattern variables
by Vp, the set of message variables by Vm, the set of session identi.er variables by
Vses and the set of step identi.er variables by Vstp. Here is an example of a pattern
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Table 4
The syntax of the logic
$ ::= X | ¬$ | [p1 # p2]$ |$1 ∧ $2 | &X:$
containing message variables, session identi.er variables and pattern variables:
p = xp:(x:i credit(B;M; xm)):yp
Intuitively, a pattern is an abstraction of a trace, where some actions are replaced by
variables. They are the basic elements used to specify formulae in our logic.
For simplicity, we introduce pattern abbreviations in the following de.nition.
Denition 3. Let p be a pattern. We de.ne p+ and p−, as follows:
#− = # #+ = x
(a:p)− = p− (a:p)+ = x:a:p+
(x:p)− = x:p− (x:p)+ = x:p+
where x is a fresh variable.
For instance, (x:a:y:b:z)− denotes the pattern (x:y:z) and (a:b)+ denotes the pattern
(x:a:y:b:z), where a and b are actions and x, y and z are pattern variables.
Now, we are ready to de.ne the syntax of our logic. Let X be a formula variable,
then the set of logic formulas is obtained by the grammar given in Table 4. The
symbols ¬ and ∧ represent negation and conjunction, respectively, while [p1#p2]
is a modal operator indexed by the two patterns p1 and p2. The formula &X:$ is a
recursive formula; the greatest .xed point operator & binds all free occurrences of X
in $.
There is a syntactic restriction on the body of &X:$ stipulating that any occurrence of
X in $ must occur under the scope of an even number of negations. We also assume
that the set of pattern variables in p2 is included in the set of pattern variables in p1
(no new variables appearing in p2). For instance [x# x:y]&X:X is not a formula since
{x; y}* {x}.
From now on, we denote by L the set of formulas of our logic and by V, the set
of formula variables (disjoint form Va and Vp). Furthermore, for convenience, we use
the following standard abbreviations:
tt≡ &X:X
< ≡ X:X
〈p1 # p2〉$≡¬[p1 # p2]¬$
X:$≡¬&X:¬$[¬X=X ]
$1 ∨ $2 ≡¬(¬$1 ∧ ¬$2)
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Table 5
The denotational semantics of the logic
<X =t; e = e(X )
<¬$=t; e = t↓ − <$=t; e
<$1 ∧ $2=t; e = <$1=t; e ∩ <$2=t; e
<[p1 # p2]$=t; e = {u ∈ t↓ | ∀ ′ : p1  ′ = u⇒ p2  ′ ∈ <$=p2  
′ ; ′◦ 
e }
<&X:$=t; e = &f where
{
f : 2T → 2T
U → < $=t; e[X →U ]
$1 → $2 ≡¬$1 ∨ $2
$1 ↔ $2 ≡$1 → $2 ∧ $2 → $1
where $[+=X ] represents the simultaneous replacement of all free occurrences of X in
$ by +.
6. Denotational semantics
We use Sub to denote the set of all possible substitutions  such that
 ∈ [Vp →T] ◦ [Vm →M] ◦ [Vses → Ises] ◦ [Vstp → Istp]
where Vp is the set of pattern variables, Vm is the set of message variables, Vses is the
set of session identi.er variables, Vstp is the set of step identi.er variables, M is the
set of messages, Ises is the set of session identi.ers, Istp is the set of step identi.ers
and .nally, T is the set of valid protocol traces. The operation ◦ denotes function
composition.
We also use Env to denote the set of all possible environments in [V→ 2T]. Fur-
thermore, we use e[X →U ] to denote the environment e′ de.ned as follows:
e′(Y ) = e(Y ) if Y = X
e′(X ) =U:
The semantics of formulas is given by the function
< = ; :L×T× Sub× Env→ 2T
de.ned inductively on the structures of formulas as shown in Table 5, where t↓ is the
set of traces inductively de.ned as follows:
(i) t ∈ t↓,
(ii) t1:a:t2 ∈ t↓⇒ t1:t2 ∈ t↓.
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Informally t↓ contains all subtraces that could be extracted from t by eliminating some
actions from the beginning, from the middle and=or from the end of t. For instance, if
t= a:b:c, then t↓= {#; a; b; c; a:b; a:c; b:c; a:b:c}. The notation t↓ is introduced to
simplify the presentation of the denotational semantics. Intuitively, given a trace t, the
semantics of a formula will be all the traces in t↓ respecting the conditions speci.ed
by this formula.
Environments are used to give a semantics to the formula X and to deal with
recursive formulae. Substitutions are internal parameters used to give a semantics to
the formula [p1#p2]$. Given an environment e and a substitution  , we say that a
trace t satis.es $ if
t ∈ <$=t; e :
Intuitively, the trace t satis.es the formula [p1#p2]$ if for all substitutions  such
that p1 = t, the new trace p2 (the modi.ed version of the trace t) satis.es the
remaining part of the formula ($). In this respect, the notation [p1#p2] has prin-
cipally two eKects. First, the part p1 allows us to verify if something has happened
somewhere in the trace t. Second, the part p2 allows us to modify the trace (delete
some actions, substitute some actions by others, add some actions) in such a way that
the remainder of the formula ($) will be veri.ed on the modi.ed version of the trace
described by p2. Notice that the restriction on the used patterns (var(p2)⊆ var(p1))
ensures that if p1 = t, then p2 is a ground trace, that is, it does not contain any
variables.
Example 4. We want to verify whether the trace t satis.es the formula $ or not,
where t and $ are de.ned as follows:{
t = b:a:c:b:d:a;
$ = 〈x1:a:x2:b:x3 # x1:x2:x3〉〈x4:b:x5:d:x6 # x4:x5:x6〉tt:
More precisely, suppose that we want to verify whether t ∈ <$= t;∅∅ or not. Then, the
veri.cation process involves the following steps:
(1) Verify if there exists at least one substitution  1 such that the trace t is equal to
(x1:a:x2 :b:x3) 1. This part is satis.ed, since the substitution  1 = {x1 → b; x2 → c;
x3 →d:a} .lls the required condition.
(2) Verify if the second version of the trace de.ned by t1 = (x1:x2:x3) = b:c:d:a sat-
is.es the second part of the formula (〈x4 :b:x5 :d:x6# x4 :x5 :x6〉). This part is also
satis.ed, since there exists another substitution  2 = {x4 → #; x5 → c; x6 → a} such
that t1 = (x4 :b:x5 :d:x6) 2.
(3) Verify if the third version of the trace de.ned by t2 = (x4 :x5 :x6) 2 = c:a satis.es
the .nal part of the formula (tt). This part is also satis.ed, since the formula tt
is satis.ed by any trace (see Example 9).
We conclude that the trace t satis.es the formula $.
It is worthwhile noting that the part 〈x1:a:x2 :b:x3# x1:x2 :x3〉 of the formula $, given
in the above example, supports two sorts of modalities:
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• Existential modality (possible): ∃ | t=(x1:a:x2 :b:x3) .
• Temporal modality (before): The pattern x1:a:x2 :b:x3 states that an action a occurs
before an action b in the analyzed trace t.
An important diKerence between our logic and the modal -calculus is the possibility
of verifying properties requiring counting.
It is well known that, despite its high expressiveness, the modal -calculus logic is
unable to express counting properties. For instance, it cannot express that the number
of occurrences of an action a is equal to the number of occurrences of another action b
in an arbitrary trace t. This counting requirement, considered to be very important for
many electronic commerce properties such as good and money atomicity, can however
be speci.ed in our logic as shown by the following example.
Example 5. Suppose that we want to specify a property expressing that a trace t
contains as many actions d (debit) as actions c (credit). This property can be speci.ed,
thanks to the .xed point formulas and the linearity feature of the logic (used actions
can be consumed), as follows:
$= &X:((〈x1:c:x2 # #〉tt ∨ 〈x1:d:x2 # #〉tt)→
(〈x1:d:x2:c:x3 # x1:x2:x3〉X ∨ 〈x1:c:x2:d:x3 # x1:x2:x3〉X ))
The .rst part of the formula above, (〈x1:c:x2# #〉tt ∨ 〈x1:d:x2# #〉tt), is satis.ed by
all traces containing the action c or d. For such traces, the second part of the formula,
(〈x1:d:x2 :c:x3# x1:x2 :x3〉X ∨ 〈x1:c:x2 :d:x3# x1:x2:x3〉X ), requires that the trace must
contain both the action c and the action d (the order is not important) and if we
remove one occurrence of these actions, the remaining trace still satis.es the whole
formula.
It is clear that the trace t=d:b:c:d does not satisfy the formula $. In fact, if we
remove one occurrence of c and one occurrence of d from this trace, the remaining
trace t′= b:d or t′′=d:b does not satisfy again the formula $.
The two above examples show the bene.t of giving the possibility of eliminating
some actions from a trace (linearity). Furthermore, this trace modi.cation capability
involved by formulas containing expressions such as [p1#p2] is not limited to simple
action eliminations. Actually, the logic gives also the possibility to replace some actions
by others or adding new actions. Thanks to this additional feature of our logic, we are
able to capture some properties whose speci.cations are very hard and even impossible
without such 2exibility and expressiveness of the logic. The secrecy property, given
later in this paper, is indeed a good example.
The formal interpretation of &X:$ is somewhat more complicated than other formulas.
As shown in Table 5, the greatest .xed point of the function f is taken as the meaning
of the formula &X:$. The existence of such a greatest .xed point is essentially based
on the following Knaster–Tarski theorem [55]:
Theorem 6 (Knaster–Tarski). Let X be any set and f a monotonic function over the
lattice (2X;⊆; ∅;X;∪;∩). Then, f has a greatest =xed point, written &f, and a least
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=xed point, written f, given by
&f=
⋃{S ⊆ X | S ⊆ f(S)};
f=
⋂{S ⊆ X |f(S) ⊆ S}:
As the next result shows, the syntactic restrictions on $ (any free occurrence of X in
$ is under an even number of negations) guarantees the monotonicity of the function
f(U )= < $ = t;  e[X →U ] over the lattice (2T;⊆; ∅;T;∪;∩). This monotonicity ensures, as
stated by the Knaster–Tarski theorem, the existence of a greatest .xed point &f.
Lemma 7. Let X be a variable and $ a formula. If free occurrences of X do not
appear negatively in $, then the function f de=ned by
f : 2T → 2T
U → < $=t; e[X →U ]
is monotonic.
Proof. The proof is by induction on the structure of $. Most cases are routine. Here
we consider the case when $ is &Y:$1 and Y =X .
free occurrences of X in $ do not appear negatively
⇒ {[$ = &Y:$1]}
free occurrences of X in $1 do not appear negatively
⇒ {[U1 ⊆ U2; induction]}
<$1=t; e[X →U1][Y →U ] ⊆ <$1=t; e[X →U2][Y →U ]
⇒ {[Set property]}
{U ⊆T|U ⊆ <$1=t; e[X →U1][Y →U ]}
⊆
{U ⊆T|U ⊆ <$1=t; e[X →U2][Y →U ]}
⇒ {[De.nitions of <$=t; e[X →U1]; <$=t; e[X →U2]
and the theorem of Knaster-Tarski]}
<$=t; e[X →U1] ⊆ <$=t; e[X →U2]:
Notice that our logic takes into consideration only one trace of a given protocol. In
our case, we suppose that the protocol is modeled by a .nite set of traces. Therefore,
we can obviously verify this .nite set of traces one by one using our logic.
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Table 6
The tableau-based proof system
R¬
H; b; e;   t ∈ ¬$
H; ¬b; e;   t ∈ $
R∧
H; b; e;   t ∈ ($1∧$2)
H; b1; e;   t∈$1 H; b2; e;   t∈$2
b1× b2 =b
R&
H; b; e;   t∈&X:$
H [X → H (X ) ∪ {t}]; b; e;   t∈$[&X:$=X ] t =∈H (X )
R[]
H; b; e;   t∈ [p1 # p2]$
11 : : : 1n
C
where:
1i =H; bi; e;  i ◦  p2  i∈$, i ∈ {1; : : : ; n}
and
C =

 { 1; : : : ;  n}={ ′ |p1  ′= t} =∅and
b1 × · · · × bn=b; n ¿ 0


7. Tableau-based proof system
The denotational semantics proposed in the previous section is based on a global
model-checking paradigm. In such a paradigm, if we want to check whether a trace t
satis.es or not a given formula $, we need to .nd all the traces in t↓ satisfying $ and
then verify if t belongs to this set or not. However, the local model-checking paradigm
allows one to verify if a given trace satis.es or not a formula without dealing with all
the traces in t↓. The local model-checking, based on tableaux proof system, aims at
verifying formulas without visiting all the sub-traces of the underlying models. Only
the sub-traces required by the tableaux are visited. In this section, we present a local
model-checking approach based on a tableau proof system to verify a formula speci.ed
in our logic.
The tableau method [24] is a backward-chaining proof search method. A tableau is a
tree labeled with formulas at each node. The construction begins with a formula placed
at the root of the tree. The tree is extended by adding new sub-trees as required by
an a priori de.ned set of inference rules. Before presenting our tableau proof system,
we need to introduce some useful notation. Let b and b′ be in {#;¬}, and let $ be a
formula. We introduce bb′, b× b′ and b$ as follows:
## = #
#¬ = ¬
¬# = ¬
¬¬ = #
#× # = #
#× ¬ = ¬
¬ × # = ¬
¬ × ¬ = ¬
b = # ⇒ b$ = $
b = ¬ ⇒ b$ = ¬$
b = b′ ⇒ b$ = b′$
Table 6 shows the tableau-based proof system. The idea behind the tableau rules is to
capture in a deductive way whether a trace t satis.es a formula $ or not. The proof
rules operate on sequents of the form H; b; e;   t∈$, where H is a mapping in
[V → 2T], b is a variable ranging over {#;¬},  a substitution, e an environment, t
a trace and $ a formula.
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A sequent 1 has a successful tableau if it is possible to derive from it, using the
rules in Table 6, a tableau all of whose leaves are successful. A leaf 1 is successful
when it meets one of the following conditions:
• 1=(H; #; e;   t∈X ) and t∈e(X ).
• 1=(H; ¬; e;   t∈X ) and t =∈e(X ).
• 1=(H; #; e;   t∈&X:$) and t∈H (X ),
• 1=(H; #; e;   t∈[p1 # p2]$) and { ′ |p1  ′= t}=∅.
All non-successful leaves to which no rules of Table 6 can be applied are called
unsuccessful leaves. More precisely, a sequent 1 is an unsuccessful leaf, if one of the
following conditions holds:
• 1=(H; #; e;   t∈X ) and t =∈e(X ).
• 1=(H; ¬; e;   t∈X ) and t∈e(X ).
• 1=(H; ¬; e;   t∈&X:$) and t∈H (X ).
• 1=(H; ¬; e;   t ∈ [p1 # p2]$) and { ′ |p1  ′= t}=∅.
Unlike common inference systems, the rules of the tableau-based proof systems are
used in a top-down fashion, meaning that the conclusions appear above premises. When
proposing a tableau system for a logic incorporating recursive formulas, a special care
should be devoted to the rules that handle recursion (.xed-point formulae). The map-
ping H is used to this end and if it is removed from the proof system some problems
arise when analyzing recursive formulas. Suppose for instance that we remove H for
the rule R& and we use this new rule to verify whether a trace t satis.es the formula
&X:X or not. According to this new rule, the trace t does not satisfy the formula &X:X ,
since the premise and the conclusion are equal.
(R&)
#; e;   t ∈ &X:X
#; e;   t ∈ &X:X
However, according to the denotational semantics, the trace t satis.es the formula &X:X .
To avoid this problem, we need to distinguish between sequents of the premise and
the sequent of the conclusion by introducing the mapping H . As a result, we have the
following proof tree leading to a successful leaf:
(R&)
H; #; e;   t ∈ &X:X
H [X → H (X ) ∪ {t}]; #; e;   t ∈ &X:X
Now, let us give the intuitive meaning of each rule of the tableau proof system.
• Rule R¬: The idea behind this rule is to allow the veri.cation of formulas of the
form ¬$. To verify if a trace t satis.es or not a formula ¬$, it is suRcient to verify
if t satis.es or not the formula $ and then to decide for the formula ¬$. In fact,
if we found that t satis.es $, we conclude that t does not satisfy the formula ¬$
and vice versa. For that reason, we use the 2ag b in which we store the negations
(to remember if we are dealing with the formula $ or the formula ¬$). Also, from
this rule, it is immediate that verifying if a trace t satis.es or not a formula ¬¬$
is equivalent to verifying if t satis.es or not the formula $, since ¬¬b=b and
(R¬)
H; b; e;   t ∈ ¬¬$
(R¬) H; ¬b; e;  	t∈¬$H; ¬¬b; e;  	t∈$
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Table 7
Proof tree
R&
∅; #; ∅; ∅a:b:c∈$
[X → {a:b:c}]; #; ∅; ∅a:b:c∈¬([x:a:y:b:z# x:y:z]¬$)
R¬
[X → {a:b:c}]; ¬; ∅; ∅a:b:c∈ [x:a:y:b:z# x:y:z]¬$
R[] [X → {a:b:c}]; ¬; ∅;  c∈¬$
R¬
[X → {a:b:c}]; #; ∅;  c∈$
R&
[X → {a:b:c; c}]; #; ∅;  c∈¬([x:a:y:b:z # x:y:z]¬$)
R¬
[X → {a:b:c; c}]; ¬; ∅;  c∈ [x:a:y:b:z # x:y:z]¬$
Notice that by using the 2ag b within sequents, to handle the ¬ connective, we
have simpli.ed considerably the number of rules in the tableau-based proof system
compared to the others de.ned in the literature such as [14]. In fact, without this 2ag
b, we need to give one rule to each kind of formula (¬$; $1∧$2; [p1#p2]$; &$)
and one another rule to its dual form (¬¬$; $1∨$2; 〈p1 # p2〉$; $). However,
by using this 2ag the number of rules in the tableau system is equal to the number of
constructor of the logic as it is the case for the denotational semantics. Furthermore,
each rule of the tableau-based semantics captures one equation of the denotational
semantics which simpli.es the proof of the completeness and the correctness of the
tableau-based semantics with respect to the denotational one.
• Rule R∧: This rule states that in order to prove that the sequent H; b; e;   t∈$1∧
$2 has a successful tableau, it is enough to verify that the sequent H; b1; e;   t∈$1
and the sequent H; b2; e;   t∈$2 have successful tableaux for some b1 and b2
such that b=b1× b2.
• Rule R&: This rule states that in order to prove that the sequent H; b; e;   t∈&X:$
has a successful tableau, it is enough to prove that the sequent H [X → H (X )∪{t}];
b;   t∈$[&X:$=X ] has a successful tableau. Moreover, the side condition t =∈H (X )
must hold.
• Rule R[]: This rule means that if { 1; : : : ;  n}={ ′ |p  ′= t} =∅ and for all i,
i∈{1 : : : n}, p2  i satis.es $, then we deduce that t satis.es $. Notice that the
negation is again handled by the .eld b.
To show how the tableau proof system works, let us give a concrete example.
Example 8. Let t=a:b:c be a trace where a, b and c are three abstract actions. In the
sequel, we show that the formula &X:〈x:a:y:b:z# x:y:z〉X is not satis.ed by t where x, y
and z are pattern variables. We need to show that the sequent ∅; #; ∅; ∅ t∈&X:〈x:a:y:b:z
# x:y:z〉X leads to an unsuccessful leaf.
We know that
&X:〈x:a:y:b:z# x:y:z〉X ≡ &X:¬([x:a:y:b:z# x:y:z]¬X )
Now, let  denote the set {x →#; y →#; z →c} and $=&X:¬([x:a:y:b:z# x:y:z]¬X ). The
proof associated with the sequent ∅; #; ∅; ∅ t∈$ is given in Table 7.
242 K. Adi et al. / Theoretical Computer Science 291 (2003) 223–283
The leaf of the derivation sequence is an unsuccessful sequent because it satis.es
the condition
H; ¬; e;   t ∈ [p1 # p2]$ and { ′ |p1  ′ = t} = ∅
We conclude that the trace a:b:c does not satisfy the formula &X:〈x:a:y:b:z〉X .
Let us give another example.
Example 9. We formally prove that any trace satis.es the formula tt. By the de.nition
of tt, we have: tt=&X:X . From the rule R&, it follows that
R&
H; b; e;   t ∈ &X:X
H [X → H (X ) ∪ {t}]; b; e;   t ∈ &X:X
According to the de.nition of successful leaves, we have that H [X →H (X )∪{t}]; b; e;
  t∈&X:X is a successful leaf. We conclude that any trace satis.es the formula tt.
We give below three major results on the .niteness, the soundness and the com-
pleteness of the proposed tableau system. Notice that the proofs of these results are
inspired by [14].
7.1. Tableau =niteness
Our goal in this section is to show that, under some conditions, every sequent 1 has
a maximum height tableau.
7.1.1. Finiteness proof
Intuitively, to show the .niteness of the tableau, we will de.ne an ordering relation
≺ between sequents and then show that
(1) if 11 is the parent of 12, then 11≺12,
(2) the ordering relation ≺ has no in.nite ascending chains.
The de.nition of the ordering relation ≺ is based on the size of formulas and another
ordering relation  between hypotheses. The size of a formula is de.ned inductively
as follows:
Denition 10. The size of a formula $, denoted by |$|, is the number of variables
and operators in $, i.e
|X |= 1
|¬$|= 1 + |$|
|$1 ∧ $2|= 1 + |$1|+ |$2|
|[p1 # p2]$|= 1 + |$|
|&X:$|= 1 + |$|
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The de.nition of  is given below.
Denition 11. Let H1 and H2 be two mappings in [V→2T]. The ordering relation
 is de.ned as follows:
(1) H1H2 exactly when for all X in V, we have H1(X )⊆H2(X ),
(2) H1=H2 exactly when H1H2 and H2H1,
(3) H1❁H2 exactly when H1H2 and H2 H1.
Now, let us de.ne the ordering relation ≺.
Denition 12. Let 11=(H1; b1;  1 t1∈$1) and 12=(H2; b2;  2 t2∈$2) be two
sequents. Then, 11≺12 holds when one of the following conditions is satis.ed:
(1) H1❁H2,
(2) H1=H2 and |$1|¿|$2|.
As we have mentioned above, to show the .niteness of the tableaux, we need to
show, .rst, that if 11 is the parent of 12, then 11≺12 and, second, we prove that
the ordering relation ≺ has no in.nite ascending chains. Let us prove that if 11 is the
parent of 12, then 11≺12. We need the following preliminary result stating that the
ordering relation ≺ is transitive.
Proposition 13. The ordering relation ≺ is transitive.
Proof. Let 11=(H1; b1;  1 t1∈$1), 12=(H2; b2;  2 t2∈$2) and 13=(H3; b3;
 3 t3∈$3) be three sequents such that 11≺12 and 12≺13. Then by the de.nition
of ≺, we have
• H1❁H2, or
• H1=H2 and |$1|¿|$2|
and
• H2❁H3, or
• H2=H3 and |$2|¿|$3|.
It follows that one of the following cases holds:
(1) H1❁H2 and H2❁H3. Then, we conclude that H1❁H3, i.e. 11≺13.
(2) H1❁H2, H2=H3 and |$2|¿|$3|. Then, we conclude that H1❁H3, i.e. 11≺13.
(3) H1=H2, |$1|¿|$2| and H2❁H3. It follows that H1❁H3, i.e. 11≺13.
(4) H1=H2, |$1|¿|$2|, H2=H3 and |$2|¿|$3|. It follows that H1=H3 and
|$1|¿|$3|, i.e., 11≺13.
In what follows, the notation 11→R 12 means that the sequent 12 is a child of the
sequent 11 using a rule R∈{R¬; R∧; R&; R[]}.
The following proposition states that if the sequent 12 is the child of the sequent 11,
then 11≺12.
Proposition 14. Let 11=(H1; b1;  1 t1∈$1) and 12=(H2; b2;  2 t2∈$2) be two
sequents and R a rule in {R¬; R∧; R&; R[]}. If 11→R 12 then, 11≺12.
244 K. Adi et al. / Theoretical Computer Science 291 (2003) 223–283
Proof. Since R∈{R¬; R∧; R&; R[]}, we have one of the following cases:
• R=R¬: From the rule R¬, it follows that H1=H2 and $1=¬$2. Therefore, we have
H1=H2 and |$1|¿|$2|. We conclude that 11≺12.
• R=R∧: From the rule R∧, it follows that H1=H2 and there exists $3 such that
$1=$2∧$3 or $1=$3∧$2. Therefore, we have H1=H2 and |$1|¿|$2|. We con-
clude that 11≺12.
• R=R&: From the rule R&, it follows that H1❁H2. We conclude that 11≺12.
• R=R[]: From the rule R[], it follows that H1=H2 and there exist two patterns p1
and p2 such that $1=[p1#p2]$2. Therefore, we have H1=H2 and |$1|¿|$2|.
We conclude that 11≺12.
Now, it only remains to show that the ordering relation ≺ has no in.nite ascending
chains. The proof of this fact requires an auxiliary notation such as the closure of a
formula and some of its properties. The closure of a formula is given by the following
de.nition.
Denition 15. The closure of a formula $, denoted by CL($), is de.ned as follows:
CL(X ) = {X }
CL(¬$) = {¬$} ∪ CL($)
CL($1 ∧ $2) = {$1 ∧ $2} ∪ CL($1) ∪ CL($2)
CL([p1 # p2]$) = {[p1 # p2]$} ∪ CL($)
CL(&X:$) = {&X:$} ∪ CL($)[&X:$=X ]
The idea underlying the de.nition of the closure of a formula is to prove that if a
tableau has a root 1=(H; b; e;   t∈$), then all sequents of the tableau with 1 as
a root have a formula in CL($). Furthermore, if we prove that CL($) is a .nite set,
then we conclude that each formula appearing in a given tableau belongs to a .nite
set. This result will be very helpful for the proof of the fact that the ordering relation
≺ has no in.nite ascending chains.
First, let us prove that the closure CL($) of the formula $ is a .nite set. The
following proposition states that CL($) is a .nite set and that |CL($)| is bounded by
|$|.
Proposition 16. Let $ be a formula, then
|CL($)|6 |$|
Proof. The proof is by structural induction on $. Most cases are routine; here we
consider the case when $ is &X:$′.
Since CL(&X:$′)={&X:$′} ∪ CL($′)[&X:$′=X ], then
|CL(&X:$′)| = 1 + |CL($′)[&X:$′=X ]|:
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Therefore, we have
|CL(&X:$′)|6 1 + |CL($′)|:
By the induction hypothesis, we deduce that
|CL(&X:$′)|6 1 + |$′|:
By the de.nition of |&X:$′|, we conclude that
|CL(&X:$′)|6 |&X:$′|:
The idea now is to show that each formula appearing in a tableau with a root
1=(H; b; e;   t∈$), belongs to CL($). To make this proof clear, we need the
following proposition establishing a link between CL($[$′=X ]), CL($) and CL($′).
Proposition 17. Let $ and $′ be two formulas such that all bound variables of $ do
not appear freely in $′. Then
CL($[$′=X ]) ⊆ CL($)[$′=X ] ∪ CL($′):
Proof. The proof is by induction on the structure of $. Most cases are routine; here
we consider the case when $ is &Y:$1.
By the de.nition of CL(&Y:$1), we have
CL(&Y:$1[$′=X ]) = {&Y:$1[$′=X ]} ∪ CL($1[$′=X ])[&Y:$1[$′=X ]=Y ]:
By the induction hypothesis, we deduce that
CL(&Y:$1[$′=X ])⊆ {&Y:$1[$′=X ]} ∪
(CL($1)[$′=X ] ∪ CL($′))[&Y:$1[$′=X ]=Y ]
⊆ {&Y:$1[$′=X ]} ∪
CL($1)[$′=X ][&Y:$1[$′=X ]=Y ] ∪
CL($′)[&Y:$1[$′=X ]=Y ]:
Since Y does not appear freely in $′, we deduce that
CL($1)[$′=X ][&Y:$1[$′=X ]=Y ] = CL($1)[&Y:$1=Y ][$′=X ]:
It follows that
CL(&Y:$1[$′=X ])⊆ {&Y:$1[$′=X ]} ∪
CL($1)[$′=X ][&Y:$1=Y ] ∪
CL($′)[&Y:$1[$′=X ]=Y ]
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⊆ {&Y:$1}[$′=X ] ∪
CL($1)[$′=X ][&Y:$1=Y ] ∪
CL($′)[&Y:$1[$′=X ]=Y ]
⊆CL(&Y:$1)[$′=X ] ∪ CL($′)[&Y:$1[$′=X ]=Y ]:
Since Y does not appear freely in $′, we can easily deduce that Y does not appear
freely in each formula of CL($′) and it follows that
CL($′)[&Y:$1[$′=X ]=Y ] = CL($′):
We conclude that
CL(&Y:$1[$′=X ]) ⊆ CL(&Y:$1)[$′=X ] ∪ CL($′):
An immediate result from the proposition above is that CL($[&X:$=X ])⊆CL(&X:$),
as shown by the following corollary.
Corollary 18. Let &X:$ be a formula such that the bound and the free variables of
$ belong to two disjoint sets. 1 Then
CL($[&X:$=X ]) ⊆ CL(&X:$):
Proof. By Proposition 17, we have
CL($[&X:$=X ]) ⊆ CL($)[&X:$=X ] ∪ CL(&X:$):
Now, since by the de.nition of CL(&X:$), we have that
CL($)[&X:$=X ] ⊆ CL(&X:$):
We conclude that
CL($[&X:$=X ]) ⊆ CL(&X:$):
Now, we can easily prove that each formula appearing in the tableau with the root
1=(H; b; e;   t ∈ $) belongs to CL($).
Proposition 19. Let 1=(H; b;   t∈$), 1′=(H ′; b′;  ′ t′∈$′) and R a rule in
{R¬; R∧; R&; R[]}.
1→R 1′ ⇒ CL($′) ⊆ CL($):
1 Variables have to be renamed so that bound and free variables of the formula $ belong to two disjoint
sets without aKecting the meaning of the original formula.
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Proof.
• R¬:
1→R¬ 1′
⇒ {[Rule R¬]}
$ = ¬$′
⇒ {[De.nition of CL(¬$′)]}
CL($′) ⊆ CL(¬$′) = CL($):
• R∧:
1→R∧ 1′
⇒ {[Rule R∧]}
$ = $1 ∧ $2 and $′ ∈ {$1; $2}
⇒ {[De.nition of CL($1 ∧ $2)]}
CL($) = CL($1 ∧ $2) ⊇ CL($1) ∪ CL($2) ⊇ CL($′):
• R[]:
1→R[] 1′
⇒ {[Rule R[]]}
$ = [p1 # p2]$′
⇒ {[De.nition of CL([p1 # p2]$′)]}
CL($′) ⊆ CL([p1 # p2]$′) = CL($):
• R&:
1→R& 1′
⇒ {[Rule R&]}
$ = &X:$1 and $′ = $1[&X:$1=X ]
⇒ {[Corollary 18]}
CL($1[&X:$1=X ]) ⊆ CL(&X:$1) = CL($):
Another useful property of CL($) is given by the following proposition.
Proposition 20. Let $ be a formula and V$ the set of all formula variables in $.
We have⋃
$′∈CL($)
V$′ =V$:
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Proof. The proof is by structural induction on $. Most cases are routine; here we
consider the case when $ is &X:$1.⋃
$′∈CL($)
V$′
= {[CL(&X:$1) = {&X:$1} ∪ CL($1)[&X:$1=X ]]}
V$ ∪
( ⋃
$′∈CL($1)
V$′[&X:$1=X ]
)
= {[V$′[&X:$1=X ] =V$′ ∪V&X:$1 ]}
V$ ∪
( ⋃
$′∈CL($1)
V$′
)
∪V&X:$1
= {[Induction]}
V$ ∪V$1
= {[$ = &X:$1]}
V$:
Recall that the De.nition 12 of the ordering relation ≺ is built over the size of
formulas and an ordering relation between hypotheses. Accordingly, since we want
to prove that ≺ has no in.nite ascending chains, it will be helpful to prove that the
hypotheses appearing in a tableau having the sequent 1 as a root could not, under some
condition, change their form in.nitely often. To reach this goal, we need the following
de.nition.
Denition 21. Let t be a trace and $ a formula. We denote by Tn(t; $) the set de.ned
inductively as follows:
T0(t; $) = {t}
Tn(t;¬$1) =Tn−1(t; $1)
Tn(t; $1 ∧ $2) =Tn−1(t; $1) ∪Tn−1(t; $2)
Tn(t; p1 # p2$1) = {t} ∪
( ⋃
 |p1 =t
Tn−1(p2 ; $1)
)
Tn(t; &X:$1) =Tn−1(t; $1[&X:$1=X ]):
We denote by T(t; $) the set de.ned as follows:
T(t; $) =
⋃
n¿0
Tn(t; $):
In what follows, we give a useful property of T(t; $).
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Proposition 22. Let 11=(H1; b1;  1 t1∈$1), 12=(H2; b2;  2 t2∈$2) and R a rule
in {R¬; R∧; R&; R[]}.
11 →R 12 ⇒ T(t2; $2) ⊆T(t1; $1):
Proof. Since 11→R 12, we have the following cases:
• R=R¬:
11 →R¬ 12
⇒ {[Rule R¬]}
t2 = t1; $1 = ¬$2
⇒ {[De.nition of T(t1; $1)(∀ n ¿ 0 : Tn(t1; $1) =Tn−1(t2; $2))]}
T(t2; $2) ⊆T(t1; $1):
• R=R∧:
11 →R∧ 12
⇒ {[Rule R∧]}
t2 = t1; $1 = $′ ∧ $′′ and $2 ∈ {$′; $′′}
⇒ {[De.nition of T(t1; $1) (T(t1; $1) =T(t1; $′) ∪T(t1; $′′))]}
T(t2; $2) ⊆T(t1; $1):
• R=R[]:
11 →R[] 12
⇒ {[Rule R[]]}
$1 = [p1 # p2]$2; ∃ |p1 1 = t1 and t2 = p2 1 
⇒ {[De.nition of T(t1; $1)]}
T(t2; $2) =T(p2 1 ; $2) ⊆T(t1; $1):
• R=R&:
11 →R& 12
⇒ {[Rule R&]}
t2 = t1; $1 = &X:$′ and $2 = $′[&X:$′=X ]
⇒ {[De.nition of T(t1; $1)(∀ n ¿ 0 :Tn(t1; $1) =Tn−1(t2; $2))]}
T(t2; $2) =T(t1; $2) ⊆T(t1; $1):
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Let T0⊆T, X0={X1; : : : ; Xn}⊆V and H ∈[V → 2T]. We de.ne H (T0;X0) as
follows:
H (T0;X0) =
⋃
(T1 ;:::;Tn)∈(2T0 )n
{H [X1 → H (X1) ∪ T1] · · · [Xn → H (Xn) ∪ Tn]}:
Let us give a useful property of H (T0;X0).
Proposition 23. Let H ∈[V→ 2T], T1⊆T, T2⊆T, X1⊆V, and X2⊆V.
X1 ⊆ X2 and T1 ⊆T2 ⇒ H (T1;X1) ⊆ H (T2;X2):
Proof. Suppose that X1={X 11 ; : : : ; X 1n1} and X2=X1 ∪ {X1; : : : ; Xl}, where l¿0 and
X1∩{X1; : : : ; Xl}=∅.
Assume that H ′ ∈ H (T1;X1)
⇒ {[De.nition of H (T1;X1)]}
∃(T1; : : : ; Tn1 ) ∈ (2T1 )n1 |
H ′ = H [X 11 → H (X 11 ) ∪ T1] : : : [X 1n1 → H (X 1n1 ) ∪ Tn1 ]
⇒ {[T1 ⊆T2]}
∃ (T1; : : : ; Tn1 ; ∅; : : : ; ∅)︸ ︷︷ ︸
n1+l
∈ (2T2 )n1+l|
H ′ = H [X 11 → H (X 11 ) ∪ T1] : : : [X 1n1 → H (X 1n1 ) ∪ Tn1 ]
⇒ {[X2 = X1 ∪ {X1; : : : ; Xl}]}
∃ (T1; : : : ; Tn1 ; ∅; : : : ; ∅)︸ ︷︷ ︸
n1+l
∈ (2T2 )n1+l|
H ′ = H [X 11 → H (X 11 ) ∪ T1] : : : [X 1n1 → H (X 1n1 ) ∪ Tn1 ]
[X1 → H (X1) ∪ ∅] : : : [Xl → H (Xl) ∪ ∅]
⇒ {[De.nition of H (T2;X2)]}
H ′ ∈ (T2;X2):
We conclude that
X1 ⊆ X2 and T1 ⊆T2 ⇒ H (T1;X1) ⊆ H (T2;X2):
The following proposition is helpful for the .niteness property.
Proposition 24. Let 1i=(Hi; bi;  i ti∈$i) and Ri in {R¬; R∧; R&; R[]} for all
i∈{1; 2; : : :}.
(11 →R1 12 →R2 13 : : :)⇒ {H1; H2; H3; : : :} ⊆ H1(T(t1; $1);V$1 ):
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Proof. Assume that 11→R1 12→R2 13 : : : .
(a) Let us prove that Hi+1(T(ti+1; $i+1);V$i+1)⊆Hi(T(ti; $i);V$i) for i¿1.
Assume 1i→R 1i+1 and consider the following cases:
• R=R¬: By hypothesis, we have
1i →R¬ 1i+1: (1)
From (1) and the de.nition of the rule R¬, it follows that
Hi+1 = Hi: (2)
From (1), (2), Propositions 20 (V$i+1⊆V$i), 22 and 23, it follows that:
Hi+1(T(ti+1; $i+1);V$i+1) ⊆ Hi(T(ti; $i);V$i)
• R=R∧: This case is similar to R¬.
• R=R[]: This case is similar to R¬.
• R=R&: Let V$i ={X1; : : : ; Xn}.
By hypothesis, we have
1i →R& 1i+1: (3)
From (3) and the de.nition of the rule R&, it follows that
$i = &X:$i+1 and Hi+1 = Hi[X → Hi(X ) ∪ {t}]: (4)
From (3), (4), Propositions 20 (V$i+1⊆V$i), 22 and 23, it follows that
Hi+1(T(ti+1; $i+1);V$i+1) ⊆ Hi[X → Hi(X ) ∪ {t}](T(ti; $i);V$i): (5)
From (5) and the de.nition of Hi[X →Hi(X )∪{t}](T(ti; $i);V$i), it follows that
Hi+1(T(ti+1; $i+1);V$i+1) ⊆
⋃
(T1 ;:::;Tn)∈(2T(ti ;$i ))n
{
Hi[X → Hi(X ) ∪ {t}][X1 → Hi(X1) ∪ T1]
· · · [Xn → Hi(Xn) ∪ Tn]}:
(6)
From (6) and since X ∈{X1; : : : ; Xn}=V$i =V&X:$i+1 , it follows that
Hi+1(T(ti+1; $i+1);V$i+1) ⊆
⋃
(T1 ;:::;Tn)∈(2T(ti ;$i ))n
{
Hi[X1 → Hi(X1) ∪ T1] · · · [Xn → Hi(Xn) ∪ Tn]}: (7)
From (7) and the de.nition of Hi(T(ti; $i);V$i), it follows that
Hi+1(T(ti+1; $i+1);V$i+1) ⊆ Hi(T(ti; $i);V$i):
(b) Let us prove that Hi∈Hi(T(ti; $i);V$i). Let V$i ={X1; : : : ; Xn}.
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By the de.nition of Hi(T(ti; $i);V$i), we have
Hi(T(ti; $i);V$i) =
⋃
(T1 ;:::;Tn)∈(2T(ti ;$i ))n
{Hi[X1 → Hi(X1) ∪ T1] · · · [Xn → Hi(Xn) ∪ Tn]}:
(8)
From (8) and since (∅; : : : ; ∅)︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
∈ (2T(ti ;$i))n, it follows that
Hi = Hi[X1 → Hi(X1) ∪ ∅] · · · [Xn → Hi(Xn) ∪ ∅] ∈ Hi(T(ti; $i);V$i):
(c) Finally, let us prove that {H1; H2; : : :}⊆H1(T(t1; $1);V$1 ).
11 →R1 12 →R2 13 →R3 · · ·
⇒ {[Result (a)]}
: : : ⊆ H3(T(t3; $3);V$3 ) ⊆ H2(T(t2; $2);V$2 )
⊆ H1(T(t1; $1);V$1 )
⇒ {[Result (b)]}
{H1; H2; : : :} ⊆ H1(T(t1; $1);V$1 ):
Now, we can easily prove the .niteness theorem as shown below.
Theorem 25 (Finiteness). For any sequent 11=(H1; b1;  1 t1∈$1), such that
T(t1; $1) is a =nite set, there is a maximum height tableau with 11 as a root.
Proof. Suppose that there exists a tableau with root 11 having an in.nite path:
11 →R1 12 →R2 13 · · · ;
where Ri, i ∈ {1; 2; 3; : : :}, is in {R¬; R∧; R&; R[]}. Then, from Propositions 13 and
14, it follows that there exists an in.nite chain
11 ≺ 12 ≺ 13 · · · :
By the de.nition of ≺ and Proposition 13, we deduce that for all i and j such that
i =j, we have
(Hi; $i) = (Hj; $j):
It follows that the set {H1; H2; H3; : : :} or the set {$1; $2; $3; : : :} is in.nite.
• Let us show that the set {H1; H2; H3; : : :} is .nite.
By Proposition 24, we deduce that
{H1; H2; H3; : : :} ⊆ H1(T(t1; $1);V$1 ):
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Let n= |V$1 |. By the de.nition of H1(T(t1; $1);V$1 ), it follows that
|{H1; H2; H3; : : :}|6 |H1(T(t1; $1);V$1 )|6 (2|T(t1 ;$1)|)n:
Since, by hypothesis, we have that |T(t1; $1)|¡∞, then it follows that
|{H1; H2; H3; : : :}|¡∞:
• Let us show that the set {$1; $2; $3; : : :} is .nite.
By Proposition 19, we have
{$1; $2; $3; : : :} ⊆ CL($1):
From Proposition 16, it follows that
|CL($1)|¡ |$1|¡∞:
Then, we conclude that {$1; $2; $3; : : :} is .nite.
Finally, since {H1; H2; H3; : : :} and {$1; $2; $3; : : :} are two .nite sets, it follows
that we have a contradiction. We conclude that for any sequent 11=H1; b1;  1 t1∈$1,
such that T(t1; $1) is a .nite set, there is a maximum height tableau with 11 as a
root.
7.1.2. Finiteness example
According to the .niteness theorem, to be sure that there is a maximum height
tableau with root 1=(H; b;   t∈$), it is suRcient to prove that the set T(t; $) is
.nite. However, proving the .niteness of T(t; $) is not trivial for some cases. It is,
therefore, worthwhile to give useful and easy to verify conditions ensuring that a given
sequent has a maximum height tableau. In this respect, we introduce in this section a
class of formulas, called well-ordered formulas, within which .niteness of the tableau
is always ensured. Notice also that almost all the security properties, given later in this
paper, are speci.ed by well-ordered formulas in our logic.
Denition 26 (Well-ordered formula). A formula $ is said to be well-ordered if one
of the following cases holds:
• $=X ,
• $=¬$1 and $1 is a well-ordered formula,
• $=$1∧$2 and $1 and $2 are well-ordered formulas,
• $=[p1#p2]$1, $1 is a well-ordered formula and for all substitutions  such that
p1 is a ground trace, we have: p2 ∈(p1 )↓,
• $=&X:$1 and $1 is a well-ordered formula.
Example 27. The formula &X:[p#p−]X is well-ordered.
Let us explain informally what a well-ordered formula is and why it allows us guarantee
the termination of the proof. As stated by the de.nition of a well-ordered formula, any
formula that does not contain the operator# is well-ordered. Therefore, to be sure that
a formula is well ordered, we have only to check the parts of this formula containing
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the operator #. As already stated, a trace t satis.es the formula $≡ [p1 # p2]$′
if for any substitution  such that t=p1 and the trace p2 satis.es the formula $′.
A well-ordered formula simply ensures that the trace (p2 ) is a sub-trace of the trace
t (t=p1 ), i.e., p2 ∈ t↓.
Now, since the set T(t; $) contains all the traces involved in a tableau with a root
1=(H; b;   t ∈$) for a given H; b and  , if $ is a well-ordered formula we are
sure that this set of involved traces will be in t↓. And since t↓ is a .nite set, it follows
that the set T(t; $) is also .nite. This proof will be formally stated in the sequel.
Proposition 28. Let $ and $′ be two well-ordered formulas and X a unbound variable
in $. We have
$[$′=X ] is a well-ordered formula:
Proof. The proof is by induction on the structure of $. Most cases are routine; here
we consider the case when $ is &Y:$1.
By the induction hypothesis, we have
$1[$′=X ] is a well-ordered formula: (9)
From (9) and the de.nition of a well-ordered formula, it follows that
&Y:($1[$′=X ]) is a well-ordered formula: (10)
Since &Y:($1[$′=X ])= (&Y:$1)[$′=X ], from (10), it follows that
$[$′=X ] = (&Y:$1)[$′=X ] is a well-ordered formula:
The following proposition gives an important relationship between T(t; $) and t↓.
Proposition 29. Let t be a trace and $ a well-ordered formula. We have
T(t; $) ⊆ t↓
Proof. By induction on n, we prove a more general result stating that for all n¿0 and
all t′ ∈ t↓ we have
Tn(t′; $) ⊆ t↓:
• n=0: We have
T0(t′; $) = {t′} ⊆ t↓
• n¿0: We have one of the following cases:
◦ $=¬$1:
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Tn(t′;¬$1)
= {[ De.nition of Tn(t′;¬$1) ]}
Tn−1(t′; $1)
⊆ {[ $1 is well ordered; Induction }]
t↓:
◦ $=$1 ∧ $2:
Tn(t′; $1 ∧ $2)
= {[ De.nition of Tn(t′; $1 ∧ $2) ]}
Tn−1(t′; $1) ∪Tn−1(t′; $2)
⊆ {[ $1 and $2 are well ordered; Induction ]}
t↓:
◦ $= [p1 # p2]$1:
Tn(t′; [p1 # p2]$1)
= {[ De.nition of Tn(t′; [p1 # p2]$1) ]}
{t′} ∪
(⋃
 | p1 =t′ Tn−1(p2 ; $1)
)
⊆ {[ De.nition of well-ordered (p2 ∈ (p1 )↓ = t′↓ ⊆ t↓);
$1 is well-ordered; Induction ]}
t↓:
◦ $= &X:$1:
Tn(t′; &X:$1)
= {[ De.nition of Tn(t′; &X:$1) ]}
Tn−1(t′; $1[&X:$1=X ])
⊆ {[ Proposition 28 ($1[&X:$1=X ] is well-ordered);
Induction ]}
t↓:
The following corollary states that any sequent 1=(H; b;   t ∈$) such that $ is
a well-ordered formula has a maximum height tableau.
Corollary 30. Let 1=(H; b;   t ∈$) be a sequent such that $ is a well-ordered
formula. Then, 1 has a maximum height tableau.
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Table 8
Termination problem
R& H; b; e;  
 a:t
′ ∈$
H [X →H (X )∪{a:t′}]; b; e;  
 a:t′ ∈ [a:x#a:a:x]$
R[] H [X →H (X )∪{a:t′}]; b; e;  ◦{x → t′} 
 a:a:t′ ∈$
Proof.
$ is a well-ordered formula
⇒ {[ Proposition 29 ]}
T(t; $) ⊆ t↓
⇒ {[ De.nition of well-founded ordering relation ]}
|T(t; $)|6 |t↓|6∞
⇒ {[ Theorem 25 ]}
1 has a maximum height tableau:
Obviously not all the formulae are well ordered and a not well-ordered formula may
lead to a termination problem. Although we do not know an interesting example of
not well-ordered formula, that does not mean that it does not exist.
In what follows, we give an example of a not well-ordered formula that leads to a
termination problem.
Example 31. Let us consider the trace t= a and the formula $= &:X [a:x# a:a:x]X .
Using the rules of the tableau-based semantics to prove the sequent H; b; e;   t ∈$
leads to a termination problem (the proof will never .nish). To prove this fact, we will
show a more general result stating that the sequent H; b; e;   a:t′ ∈$ has a successful
tableau if and only if the sequent H [X →H (X )∪{a:t′}]; b; e;  ◦  ′  a:a:t′ ∈$ has
a successful tableau for a given substitution  ′ as shown by Table 8. Now, since
the sequent H; b; e;   a:t′ ∈$ has a successful tableau if and only if the sequent
H [X →H (X )∪{a:t′}]; b; e;  ◦  ′  a:a:t′ ∈$ has a successful tableau, then proving
that the sequent H [X →H (X )∪{a:t′}]; b; e;  ◦ ′  a:a:t′ ∈$ has a successful tableau
leads to prove that the sequent H [X →H (X )∪{a:t′; a:a:t′}]; b; e;  ◦ ′◦ ′′  a:a:a:t′ ∈$
has a successful tableau and so one. It follows that some no well-ordered formula may
lead to a termination problem using the tableau-based system.
7.2. Soundness and completeness
In this section, we discuss the soundness and the completeness of the tableau proof
system with respect to the denotational semantics.
All the results related to the tableau soundness and completeness proofs are given
with respect to a more general denotational semantics, called relativized semantics, as
shown in Table 9. The diKerence between this semantics and the one given in Table 5
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Table 9
The relativized denotational semantics
<X = t;  ; He = e(X )
<¬$= t;  ; He = t↓ − <$= t;  ; He
<$1 ∧ $2= t;  ; He = <$1= t;  ; He ∩ <$2= t;  ; He
<[p1 # p2]$= t;  ; He = {u∈ t↓ | ∀ ′ : p1  ′= u ⇒ p2  ′ ∈ <$=p2  
′ ;  ′◦ ; H
e }
<&X:$= t;  ; He = &fH (X ) ∪H (X )
where f(S) = <$= t;  ; He[X →S]
fS′ (S) = f(S ∪ S′)
mainly concerns the .xed-point operator. Actually, the relativized semantics uses the
mapping H that associates sets of traces to variables. Notice that, if for all X ∈V, we
have that H (X )= ∅, then
<$=t;  ; He = <$=t;  e :
As a result, the proof of the soundness of the tableau proof system can be achieved
by merely proving the following more general statement:
If H; b;   t ∈ $ has a successful tableau then t ∈ <b$=t;  ; He :
To simplify the soundness proof, we start by introducing some results related to mono-
tonic functions.
Proposition 32. Let S; S ′ and X be three sets such that (S ∪ S ′)⊆X; f a mono-
tonic function over the complete lattice 〈2X; ⊆ ;∪;∩〉 and fS′ the function de=ned by
fS′(S)=f(S ′ ∪ S). Then, we have the following results:
(1) fS′ is monotonic.
(2) x∈ &f if and only if x∈ &f{x}.
Proof.
(1) fS′ is monotonic: This result is immediate from the de.nition of fS′ and the
de.nition of a monotonic function.
(2) x∈ &f if and only if x∈ &f{x}:
⇒
Suppose that x∈ &f. From the de.nition of &f it follows that
x ∈ ⋃{S ⊆ X | S ⊆ f(S)}:
Therefore, there exists S such that x∈ S and S ⊆f(S). Since x∈ S, we have
S = S ∪{x} and it follows that f(S)=f({x}∪ S)=f{x}(S). Now, since S ⊆f(S)
and f(S)=f{x}(S), then we deduce that S ⊆f{x}(S). Finally, since x∈ S and
S ⊆f{x}(S), by the de.nition of &f{x}, we conclude that x∈ &f{x}.
⇐
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Suppose that x∈ &f{x}. By the de.nition of &f{x}, we deduce that there exists
a set S, S ⊆X, such that x∈ S and S ⊆f{x}(S). Since f{x}(S)=f({x}∪ S)=
f(S), and since x∈ S and S ⊆f(S), we conclude that x∈ &f.
Another helpful proposition for the soundness proof is the following.
Proposition 33. Let $ and $′ be two formulas such that the set of bound variables
of $ and the set of free variables of $′ are disjoint and let X be a variable. We have
<$[$′=X ]=t;  ; He = f(<$′=t;  ; He );
where f(S)= <$=t;  ; He[X →S].
Proof. The proof is by induction on the structure of $. Most cases are routine; here
we consider the case when $ is &Y:$1.
f(<$′=t;  ; He ) = <&Y:$1=
t;  ; H
e[X →<$′=t;  ; He ]
= ∪{S ∈ 2T |
S ⊆ <$1=t;  ; He[X →<$′=t;  ; He ][Y →S∪H (X )]} ∪ H (X )
= ∪{S ∈ 2T |
S ⊆ <$1=t;  ; He[Y →S∪H (X )][X →<$′=t;  ; He ]} ∪ H (X )
{[ By hypothesis
(Y is not free in $′ since Y is bound in $) ]}
= ∪{S ∈ 2T |
S ⊆ <$1=t;  ; He[Y →S∪H (X )][X →<$′=t;  ; He[Y →S∪H (X )]]} ∪ H (X )
{[By induction (<$1[$′=X ]=t;  ; He[Y →S∪H (X )] =
<$1=t;  ; He[Y →S∪H (X )][X →<$′=t;  ; He[Y →S∪H (X )]]) ]}
= ∪{S ∈ 2T | S ⊆ <$1[$′=X ]=t;  ; He[Y →S∪H (X )]} ∪ H (X )
= <&Y:($1[$′=X ])=t;  ; He
= <(&Y:$1)[$′=X ]=t;  ; He :
Theorem 34 (Soundness). If H; b; e   t ∈$ has a successful tableau, then t ∈
<b$=t;  ; He .
Proof. It is suRcient to establish that each successful leaf is semantically valid and
each inference rule preserves soundness.
leaves: we have only four sorts of successful leaves:
• H; #; e;   t ∈X and t ∈ e(X ):
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It is immediate, from the de.nition of <X =t;  ; He , that:
t ∈ <X =t;  He :
• H; ¬; e;   t ∈X and t =∈ e(X ):
It is immediate, from the de.nition of <¬X =t;  ; He , that
t ∈ <¬X =t;  ; He :
• H; #; e;   t ∈ &X:$ and t ∈H (X ):
Since t ∈H (X ), we deduce that
t ∈ &fH (X ) ∪ H (X ):
Since:
<&X:$=t;  ; He = &fH (X ) ∪ H (X );
we conclude that
t ∈ <&X:$=t;  ;He :
• H; #; e;   t ∈ [p1 # p2]$ and { ′ | t=p1  ′}= ∅:
Since:

<[p1 # p2]$=t;  ; He = {u ∈ t↓ | ∀ ′ ∈ { ′ | u = p1  ′}:
p2  ′ ∈ <$=p2  ′ ; ′◦ ;He }
and
{ ′ | t = p1  ′} = ∅
we conclude that
t ∈ <[p1 # p2]$=t;  ; He :
R&: From the de.nition of the relativized semantics, we have
<&X:$=t;  ; (H [X →H (X )∪{t}])e = &fH (X )∪{t} ∪ H (X ) ∪ {t}: (11)
By Proposition 33, we have
<$[&X:$=X ]=t;  ; H [X →H (X )∪{t}]e = f(<&X:$=t;  ; (HX †[X →H (X )∪{t}])e ): (12)
From (11) and (12), it follows that
<$[&X:$=X ]=t;  ; H [X →H (X )∪{t}]e =f(&fH (X )∪{t} ∪ H (X ) ∪ {t})
=fH (X )∪{t}(&fH (X )∪{t})
= &fH (X )∪{t} (13)
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By Proposition 32, we have{
t ∈ &fH (X )∪{t} ⇒ t ∈ &fH (X );
t =∈ &fH (X )∪{t} ⇒ t =∈ &fH (X ):
(14)
By the induction hypothesis, we have
t ∈ <b$[&X:$=X ]=t;  ; (H [X →H (X )∪{t}])e
t =∈ H (X )
(15)
• b= #: From (15), it follows that
t ∈ <$[&X:$=X ]=t;  ; (H [X →H (X )∪{t}])e : (16)
From (14)–(16), and since b= #, it follows that
t ∈ <b$[&X:$=X ]=t;  ; (H [X →H (X )∪{t}])e = &fH (X )∪{t}
⇒ t ∈ <b&X:$=t;  ; He ⊇ fH (X ):
• b=¬: From (15) and the relativized semantics, it follows that
t ∈ t↓ − <$[&X:$=X ]=t;  ; (H [X →H (X )∪{t}])e : (17)
From (17), it follows that
t =∈ <$[&X:$=X ]=t;  ; (H [X →H (X )∪{t}])e : (18)
From (13) and (18), it
follows that
t =∈ &fH (X )∪{t}: (19)
From (14) and (19), it follows that
t =∈ &fH (X ): (20)
From (15) and (20), it follows that
t =∈ &fH (X ) ∪ H (X ): (21)
From (15) and the de.nition of t↓, it follows that
t ∈ t↓ − &fH (X ) ∪ H (X ): (22)
From (22) and the de.nition of <b&X:$=t;  ; He , it follows that
t ∈ <b&X:$=t;  ; He :
We conclude that soundness is preserved by the rule R&.
R¬; R∧ and R[]: The proofs associated to these rules are standard.
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The proof of the completeness result is deduced from the soundness theorem and
the following proposition.
Proposition 35. Let t be a trace and $ a formula such that T(t; $) is a =nite set.
We have
H; b; e;   t ∈ $ has a successful tableau
⇔
H; b; e;   t ∈ ¬$ has no successful tableau
Proof.
• ⇒:
By hypothesis, the sequent H; b; e;   t ∈$ has a successful tableau. Suppose that
H; b; e;   t ∈¬$ also has a successful tableau. Then, by the soundness theorem,
we deduce that{
t ∈ <b$=t;  ; He
t ∈ <b¬$=t;  ; He
Since b¬=¬b, it follows that{
t ∈ <b$=t;  ; He
t ∈ <¬b$=t;  ; He
By the de.nition of <¬b$=t;  ; He , we deduce that{
t ∈ <b$=t;  ; He
t =∈ <b$=t;  ; He
Then, we have a contradiction and we conclude that if H; b; e;   t ∈$ has a
successful tableau, then H; b; e;   t ∈¬$ has no successful tableau.
• ⇐:
Since T(t; $) is a .nite set, it follows that each path in the tableau leads to a
leaf. Therefore, to prove that H; b; e;   t ∈$ has a successful tableau whenever
H; b; e;   t ∈¬$ has no successful tableau, it is suRcient to show that each un-
successful leaf satis.es this result and that this result is preserved by each inference
rule.
leaves: We have the following unsuccessful leaves:
◦ H; #; e;   t ∈X and t =∈ e(X ):
Since t =∈ e(X ), then:
(R¬)
H; #; e;   t ∈ ¬X
H; ¬; e;   t ∈ X ;
is the unique tableau that has the root H; #; e;   t ∈¬X and since it is successful,
we conclude that H; #; e;   t ∈¬X has a successful tableau.
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◦ H; ¬; e;   t ∈X and t ∈ e(X ):
Since t ∈ e(X ), then
(R¬)
H; ¬; e;   t ∈ ¬X
H; #;   t ∈ X ;
is the unique tableau that has the root H; ¬; e;   t ∈¬X and since it is suc-
cessful, we conclude that H; ¬; e;   t ∈¬X has a successful tableau.
◦ H; ¬; e;   t ∈ &X:$ and t ∈H (X ):
Since t ∈ &X:$, then
(R¬)
H; ¬; e;   t ∈ ¬&X:$
H; #; e;   t ∈ &X:$ ;
is the unique tableau that has the root H; ¬; e;   t ∈¬&X:$ and since it is
successful, we conclude that H; ¬; e;   t ∈¬&X:$ has a successful tableau.
◦ H; ¬; e;   t ∈ [p1 # p2]$ and { ′ | t=p1 ′ }= ∅.
Since { ′ | t=p1 ′ }= ∅, then
(R¬)
H; ¬; e;   t ∈ ¬[p1 # p2]$
H; #; e;   t ∈ [p1 # p2]$ ;
is the unique tableau that has the root H; ¬; e;   t ∈¬[p1 # p2]$ and since
it is successful, we conclude that H; ¬; e;   t ∈¬[p1 # p2]$ has a successful
tableau.
R[]: H; b; e;   t ∈ [p1 # p2]$ has no successful tableau.
According to the rule R[], we deduce that:
◦ { 1; : : : ;  n}= { ′ | t=p1  ′} = ∅,
◦ ∀b1; : : : ; bn such that b1 × · · · × bn= b there exists at least one bi ∈{b1; : : : ; bn}
such that H; bi; e;  i ◦  p2  i ∈$ has no successful tableau.
Let {b1; : : : ; bn}= {bi1 ; : : : ; bin1 }∪ {bj1 ; : : : ; bjn2} such that all the following sequents
have no successful tableau:

H; bi1 ; e;  i1 ◦   p2  i1 ∈ $
...
H; bin1 ; e;  in1 ◦   p2  in1 ∈ $
and all the following sequents have successful tableaux:


H; bj1 ; e;  j1 ◦   p2  j1 ∈ $
...
H; bjn2 ; e;  jn2 ◦   p2  jn2 ∈ $
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Suppose now that b= #, then we deduce that b1 = · · · = bn= #. It follows that all
the following sequents have no successful tableaux:

H; #; e;  i1 ◦   p2  i1 ∈ $
...
H; #; e;  in1 ◦   p2  in1 ∈ $
and all the following sequents have successful tableaux:

H; #; e;  j1 ◦   p2  j1 ∈ $
...
H; #; e;  jn2 ◦   p2  jn2 ∈ $
We can now apply the induction hypothesis and deduce that all the following sequents
have successful tableaux:

H; #; e;  i1 ◦   p2  i1 ∈ ¬$
...
H; #; e;  in1 ◦   p2  in1 ∈ ¬$
H; #; e;  j1 ◦   p2  j1 ∈ $
...
H; #; e;  jn2 ◦   p2  jn2 ∈ $
By the rule R¬, we deduce that all the following sequents have successful tableaux:

H; ¬; e;  i1 ◦   p2  i1 ∈ $
...
H; ¬; e;  in1 ◦   p2  in1 ∈ $
H; #; e;  j1 ◦   p2  j1 ∈ $
...
H; #; e;  jn2 ◦   p2  jn2 ∈ $
By the rule R[], we have
H; ¬; e;   t ∈ [p1 # p2]$ has a successful tableau:
Finally, by the rule R¬, we conclude that
H; b; e;   t ∈ ¬[p1 # p2]$ has a successful tableau:
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Suppose now that b=¬. Let us show that for all b′ ∈{bi1 ; : : : ; bin1 }, and b′′ ∈{bj1 ; : : : ; bjn2 }, we have b′=¬ and b′′= #. Suppose that b′ ∈{bi1 ; : : : ; bin1 } and b′= #
(for simplicity, we consider that b′= bi1 ), it follows that all the following sequents
have no successful tableaux:

H; #; e;  i1 ◦   p2  i1 ∈ $
H; bi2 ; e;  i2 ◦   p2  i2 ∈ $
...
H; bin1 ; e;  in1 ◦   p2  in1 ∈ $
and all the following sequents have successful tableaux:

H; bj1 ; e;  j1 ◦   p2  j1 ∈ $
...
H; bin2 ; e;  in2 ◦   p2  in2 ∈ $
Then, we can apply the induction hypothesis and deduce that all the following
sequents have successful tableaux:

H; #; e;  i1 ◦   p2  i1 ∈ ¬$
H; bi2 ; e;  i2 ◦   p2  i2 ∈ ¬$
...
H; bin1 ; e;  in1 ◦   p2  in1 ∈ ¬$
H; bj1 ; e;  j1 ◦   p2  j1 ∈ $
...
H; bin2 ; e;  in2 ◦   p2  in2 ∈ $
By the rule R¬, we deduce that all the following sequents have successful tableaux:

H; ¬; e;  i1 ◦   p2  i1 ∈ $
H; ¬bi2 ; e;  i2 ◦   p2  i2 ∈ $
...
H; ¬bin1 ; e;  in1 ◦   p2  in1 ∈ $
H; bj1 ; e;  j1 ◦   p2  j1 ∈ $
...
H; bin2 ; e;  in2 ◦   p2  in2 ∈ $
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By the rule R[], it follows that
H; ¬; e;   t ∈ [p1 # p2]$ has a successful tableau:
Since b=¬, we deduce that
H; b; e;   t ∈ [p1 # p2]$ has a successful tableau:
We conclude that there is a contradiction.
Similarly, suppose that b′′ ∈{bj1 ; : : : ; bjn2 } and b′′=¬ (for simplicity, we consider
that b′= bj1 ), it follows that all the following sequents have no successful
tableaux:


H; bi1 ; e;  i1 ◦   p2  i1 ∈ $
...
H; bin1 ; e;  in1 ◦   p2  in1 ∈ $
and all the following sequents have successful tableaux:


H; ¬; e;  j1 ◦   p2  j1 ∈ $
H; bj2 ; e;  j2 ◦   p2  j2 ∈ $
...
H; bin2 ; e;  in2 ◦   p2  in2 ∈ $
Then, we can apply the induction hypothesis and deduce that all the following
sequents have successful tableaux:


H; bi1 ; e;  i1 ◦   p2  i1 ∈ ¬$
...
H; bin1 ; e;  in1 ◦   p2  in1 ∈ ¬$
H; ¬; e;  j1 ◦   p2  j1 ∈ $
H; bj2 ; e;  j2 ◦   p2  j2 ∈ $
...
H; bin2 ; e;  in2 ◦   p2  in2 ∈ $
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By the rule R¬, we deduce that all the following sequents have successful tableaux:


H; ¬bi1 ; e;  i1 ◦   p2  i1 ∈ $
...
H; ¬bin1 ; e;  in1 ◦   p2  in1 ∈ $
H; ¬; e;  j1 ◦   p2  j1 ∈ $
H; bj2 ; e;  j2 ◦   p− j2 ∈ $
...
H; bin2 ; e;  in2 ◦   p2  in2 ∈ $
By the rule R[], it follows that
H; ¬; e;   t ∈ [p1 # p2]$ has a successful tableau:
Since b=¬, we deduce that
H; b;   t ∈ [p1 # p2]$ has a successful tableau:
We conclude that there is a contradiction.
Now, it is clear that for all b′ ∈{bi1 ; : : : ; bin1 }; b′=¬ and for all b′′ ∈{bj1 ; : : : ; bjn2 };
b′′= #. It follows that:
All the following sequents have no successful tableaux:


H; ¬; e;  i1 ◦   p2  i1 ∈ $
...
H; ¬; e;  in1 ◦   p2  in1 ∈ $
And all the following sequents have successful tableaux:


H; #; e;  j1 ◦   p2  j1 ∈ $
...
H; #; e;  in2 ◦   p2  in2 ∈ $
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Then, we can apply the induction hypothesis and deduce that all the following
sequents have successful tableaux:

H; ¬; e;  i1 ◦   p2  i1 ∈ ¬$
...
H; ¬; e;  in1 ◦   p2  in1 ∈ ¬$
H; #; e;  j1 ◦   p2  j1 ∈ $
...
H; #; e;  in2 ◦   p2  in2 ∈ $
By the rule R¬, we deduce that all the following sequents have successful tableaux:

H; #; e;  i1 ◦   p2  i1 ∈ $
...
H; #; e;  in1 ◦   p2  in1 ∈ $
H; #; e;  j1 ◦   p2  j1 ∈ $
...
H; #; e;  in2 ◦   p2  in2 ∈ $
By the rule R[], it follows that
H; #; e;   t ∈ [p1 # p2]$ has a successful tableau:
Since b=¬, by the rule R¬, we conclude that
H; b; e;   t ∈ ¬[p1 # p2]$ has a successful tableau:
R¬; R∧ and R&: The proofs associated to these rules are standard.
The completeness of the tableau-based proof system is given by the following
theorem.
Theorem 36 (Completeness). Let t be a trace and $ a formula such that T(t; $) is
a =nite set. We have:
t ∈ <b$=t;  ; He ⇒ H; b; e;   t ∈ $ has a successful tableau:
Proof. Suppose that{
t ∈ <b$=t;  ; He
H; b; e;   t ∈ $ has no successful tableau
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Since T(t; $) is a .nite set, by Proposition 35, we deduce that
H; b; e;   t ∈ ¬$ has a successful tableau:
By the soundness theorem, it follows that
t ∈ <¬b$=t;  ; He ;
meaning that
t =∈ <b$=t;  ; He ;
which is a contradiction.
8. Comparison with the modal -calculus
In this section, we present a comparison between our logic and the modal -calculus
as used in [14]. The comparison is done according to the syntax, the semantics and
the associated tableau proof system.
8.1. Syntax
The construction of formulas in our logic is based on patterns, which are sequences
of actions and variables. Each variable in a pattern abstracts a possibly empty se-
quence of actions. However, the notion of pattern is not used in the modal -calculus.
Furthermore, our logic introduces a new modal operator # indexed by two patterns
[p1 # p2]. This powerful operator does not exist in the modal -calculus. It provides
our logic with more expressiveness and 2exibility when specifying security properties
as we will explain later in this paper.
8.2. Semantics
At the semantic level, we have the following diKerences:
• The model used to evaluate a formula in our logic is a trace whereas the model
used to evaluate a formula in the modal -calculus is a transition system.
• We use a dynamic model, i.e., a formula in our logic such as [p1 # p2]$ could
change the model (e.g., introduce new actions in the trace, eliminate or modify other
actions). However in the case of the modal -calculus, the model is static in the
sense that the interpretation does not change the transition system under which the
formula is evaluated.
• The meanings of the diamond (〈 〉) and the box ([ ]) operators in our logic are
diKerent from the ones of the modal -calculus. For instance, the formula [p1 #
p2]$ in our logic allows us to verify if there exists at least one substitution  that
makes equal the analyzed trace t to the pattern p1 and the rest of the formula ($)
has to be satis.ed in the new version of the trace de.ned by p2 .
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8.3. Expressiveness
We designed the operator # in order to provide our logic with a linearity feature,
which is not present in the modal -calculus. More accurately, an important diKer-
ence between our logic and the modal -calculus is the speci.cation and veri.cation
of properties that involve counting. Despite the high expressiveness of the modal -
calculus, it fails to capture such properties. Counting is an essential ingredient in the
speci.cation of many security properties such as authentication and good atomicity.
Since our logic semantics allows the dynamic modi.cation of the model, this makes
possible the capture of important secrecy properties that do not seem to be expressible
in the modal -calculus.
8.4. Tableau proof system
Our tableau proof system is diKerent from the one proposed in [14] in several ways:
• Our logic is quite diKerent from the modal -calculus by its syntax and its semantics.
Therefore, our tableau proof system has to be diKerent from the one proposed by
Cleaveland [14].
• We have used an extra parameter consisting of a 2ag b within the sequents to handle
the ¬ connective. Hence, we have simpli.ed considerably the number of rules in
the tableau-based proof system comparatively to the one de.ned by Cleaveland in
[14]. In fact, without this 2ag b, we need to give one rule to each kind of formula
(¬$; $1 ∧ $2; [p1 # p2]$; &$) and another rule to its dual form (¬¬$; $1 ∨
$2; 〈p1 # p2〉$; $). By using this 2ag the number of rules in the tableau system
are equal to the number of the logic constructors. Furthermore, each rule of the
tableau-based semantics captures one equation of the denotational semantics which
simpli.es the proofs of soundness and completeness.
9. Security properties
To exemplify the expressiveness of the proposed logic, we present below the for-
malization of some important security properties.
9.1. Authentication
In [33,34], Lower discusses many authentication de.nitions proposed in the literature
[15,22,44]. He points out their weaknesses and he concludes by proposing a hierarchy
of authentication de.nitions. The strongest one is: Whenever an agent A completes a
run of the protocol, apparently with B, then B has recently been running the protocol,
apparently with A, and the two agents agree upon who initiated the run, and agree upon
all data values used in the run; moreover, there is a one–one relationship between the
runs of A and the runs of B.
We adopt here an amended version of this de.nition by taking into account those
data2ow constraints on messages induced by communications, i.e., a message received
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Table 10
De.nition of PSL
#SL = #
(a:P)SL =


(x:i A B B : m):(P)SL if i∈ L; (A; x)∈ S
and a=(:i A B B : m)
(x:i A C B : m):(P)SL if i∈ L; (A; x)∈ S
and a=(:i A C B : m)
PSL otherwise
by a regular principal A has to have been previously sent by a regular principal B in
the same protocol run. To formalize this de.nition, we need the following auxiliary
notation:
Let S be a set of pairs (principal identity, session variable), P a protocol and L a
set of natural numbers. We de.ne PSL as shown in Table 10.
The operation PSL aims at extracting from the protocol P those communication steps
whose step identi.ers are in L and for which there exists an element (A; x) in S such
that A participates in these steps. The session identi.er of the protocol steps in which
A participates should be renamed by x. This operator achieves a projection of the
protocol over some steps in L and some principals in S up to renaming of the session
identi.ers. For example, let P be the following protocol:


:1 A→ B : m1
:2 B→ A : m2
:3 A→ B : m3
≡


:1 A B B : m1
:1 B C A : m1
:2 B B A : m2
:2 A C B : m2
:3 A B B : m3
:3 B C A : m3
Now, let L be the set {1; 2} and S be the set {(A; x); (B; y)}. Therefore,
PSL =


x:1 A B B : m1
y:1 B C A : m1
y:2 B B A : m2
x:2 A C B : m2
We say that a principal A proves its identity to another principal B in the steps reported
by L (the set L could be used for a partial authentication), and we write AAB (L),
if the following holds. Whenever the principal B runs the L-steps in a session y,
there exists a session x in which the principal A runs the L-steps and the L-steps
of the session x are a “forward” of the L-steps of the session y, i.e. what is sent
(resp. received) in the session x by A is received (resp. sent) in the session y by the
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principal B. Moreover, the property remains true if we remove from the model all the
steps contained in P{(A; x); (B;y)}L . More formally, let pb and pab denote the following
patterns (see De.nition 3 for the operators + and −):
pb = (P
{(B;y)}
L )
+
pab = (P
{(A;x);(B;y)}
L )
+
The speci.cation of the authentication property is as follows:
AAB (L)≡ &X (〈pb# #〉tt→〈pab#p−ab〉X )
Example 37. Let P be the following simpli.ed version of the protocol proposed by
Needham and Schroeder:
:1 A→ B : {Na}kab
:2 B→ A : {Na + 1}kab
The objective of this protocol is to achieve a mutual authentication between two prin-
cipals A and B. At step one, the principal A sends a challenge which is a nonce Na
encrypted using the key kab. The principal B replies to this challenge by an encrypted
version (under kab) of the message Na+1 at step two. This protocol could be attacked
as follows:
:1 A→ I(B) : {Na}kab
<:1 I(B)→ A : {Na}kab
<:2 A→ I(B) : {Na + 1}kab
:2 I(B)→ A : {Na + 1}kab
At step one of the run , the intruder intercepts the message {Na}kab and uses it as
its own challenge in the .rst step of the run <. Therefore, it is not surprising that the
principal playing the role A will answer by sending the message {Na + 1}kab in step
two of the run <. Furthermore, this message is also the required one to .nish the .rst
run. Finally, A is convinced that the principal B is operational, however this principal
may not exist any longer. An equivalent representation of the above 2aw is given by
the following trace:
t =


(:1 A B B : {Na}kab):
(<:1 A C B : {Na}kab):
(<:2 A B B : {Na + 1}kab):
(:2 A C B : {Na + 1}kab)
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Now, let us see how this 2aw can be discovered using our logic. Since the principal
B has to prove its identity to the principal A, the authentication property is therefore
ABA({1; 2}) ≡ &X (〈pa # #〉tt → 〈pba # p−ba〉X )
where
pa = (P
{(A;y)}
{1;2} )
+
= (y:1A B B : {Na}kab):(y:2A C B : {Na + 1}kab)+
= x1:(y:1A B B : {Na}kab):x2:(y:2A C B : {Na + 1}kab):x3
and
pba = (P
{(B;x);(A;y)}
{1;2} )
+
=


(y:1 A B B : {Na}kab):
(x:1 B C A : {Na}kab):
(x:2 B B A : {Na + 1}kab):
(y:2 A C B : {Na + 1}kab)


+
=


y1:
(y:1 A B B : {Na}kab):
y2:
(x:1 B C A : {Na}kab):
y3:
(x:2 B B A : {Na + 1}kab):
y4:
(y:2 A C B : {Na + 1}kab):
y5
Notice that the authentication property is not satis.ed by the trace t, since there exists
a substitution  1,
 1 = { x1 → #; y → ;
x2 → (<:1A C B : {Na}kab):(<:2A B B : {Na + 1}kab);
x3 → #
}
such that pa 1 = t, but there is no other substitution  2 such that pba 2 = t.
Example 38. Let P be the following simple protocol:
:1 A → B : A
According to this protocol, the principal A needs only to send its identity to the prin-
cipal B. As a result, the principal B is convinced that it is talking with the principal
A. The authentication property is as follows:
AAB({1}) ≡ &X (〈pb # #〉tt → 〈pab # p−ab〉X )
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where
pb = (P
{(B;y)}
{1} )
+
= (y:1B C A : A)+
= x1:(y:1B C A : A):x2
and
pab = (P
{(A;x);(B;y)}
{1} )
+
=
(
(x:1 A B B : A):
(y:1 B C A : A)
)+
=


x3:
(x:1 A B B : A):
x4:
(y:1 B C A : A):
x5
Now, let t be the following trace:
t =


(:1 A B B : A):
(<:1 B C A : A):
(=:1 B C A : A)
≡


(:1 A → I(B) : A):
(<:1 I(A) → B : A):
(=:1 I(A) → B : A)
Then
{ |pb = t} = { {x1 → (:1A B B : A); y → <; x2 → (=:1B C A : A)};
{x1 → (:1A B B : A):(<:1B C A : A); y → =; x2 → #}
}
{ |pab = t} = { {x → ; y → <; x3 → #; x4 → #; x5 → (=:1B C A : A)};
{x → ; y → =; x3 → #; x4 → (<:1B C A : A); x5 → #}
}
Now, since for all  1 ∈{ |pb = t} and for all  2 ∈{ |pab = t}, the trace p−ab 2 is
in {(<:1B C A : A); (=:1B C A : A)} and does not satisfy the authentication formula.
We conclude that the original trace t does not satisfy the authentication property.
In what follows, we give a more complete example of the analysis of cryptographic
protocol using our logic.
Example 39. We describe an attack of the Woo and Lam cryptoprotocol and show
how to .nd this attack by using our logic and the inductive trace-based model. The de-
scription of the attack using the standard notation is given in Table 11. The trace con-
taining this attack can be generated from the derivation rules by applying successively
the rules empty, Intruder, Message 2, Message 3, Receive, Message 4, Mes-
sage 1, Message 2, Message 3, Message 4, Receive, Message 5 and Receive.
In the Woo and Lam cryptoprotocol, the principal A wants to prove its identity to the
principal B. Furthermore, this protocol involves three principals A, B and S, however
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Table 11
An attack of the Woo and Lam cryptoprotocol
1:1 I(A) → B : A
1:2 B → I(A) : N 1b
1:3 I(A) → B : {N 1b }Kis
1:4 B → I(S) : {A; {N 1b }Kis}Kbs
2:1 I → B : I
2:2 B → I : N 2b
2:3 I → B : {N 2b }Kis
2:4 B → I(S) : {I; {N 1b }Kis}Kbs
3:4 I(B) → S : {I; {N 1b }Kis}Kbs
3:5 S → I(B) : {N 1b }Kbs
1:5 I(S) → B : {N 1b }Kbs
the previously given authentication property deals with protocols involving only two
principals A and B. Therefore, we need .rst to extend the authentication property to
deal with more general protocols as shown below:
AA;SB ({1; 2; 3; 4; 5}) ≡ &X (〈pb # #〉tt → 〈pasb # p−asb〉X ) (23)
where pasb=(P
{(A; x); (S; y)(B; z)}
{1;2;3;4;5} ).
Informally, this property states that whenever an agent B completes a run of the
protocol, apparently with both A and S, then A and S have recently been running the
protocol, apparently with B, and the three agents agree upon who initiated the run, and
agree upon all data values used in the run; moreover, there is a one–one relationship
between the runs of A and the runs of B on the one hand, and the runs of S and the
runs of B on the other hand.
pb = (P
{(B;z)}
{1;2;3;4;5})
+ =


(z:1 B C A : A):
(z:2 B B A : Nzb ):
(z:3 B C A : {Nzb}kas ):
(z:4 B B A : {A; {Nzb}kas}kbs ):
(z:5 B C A : {Nzb}kbs ):


+
=


x1:
(z:1 B C A : A):
x2:
(z:2 B B A : Nzb ):
x3:
(z:3 B C A : {Nzb}kas ):
x4:
(z:4 B B S : {A; {Nzb}kas}kbs ):
x5:
(z:5 B C S : {Nzb}kbs ):
x6:
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and
pasb = (P
{(A;x);(S;y)(B;z)}
{1;2;3;4;5} )
+
=


(x:1 A B B : A):
(z:1 B C A : A):
(z:2 B B A : Nzb ):
(x:2 A C B : Nzb ):
(x:3 A B B : {Nzb}kas ):
(z:3 B C A : {Nzb}kas ):
(z:4 B B A : {A; {Nzb}kas}kbs ):
(y:4 S C B : {A; {Nzb}kas}kbs ):
(y:5 S B B : {Nzb}kbs ):
(z:5 B C A : {Nzb}kbs ):


+
=


y1:
(x:1 A B B : A):
y2:
(z:1 B C A : A):
y3:
(z:2 B B A : Nzb ):
y4:
(x:2 A C B : Nzb ):
y5:
(x:3 A B B : {Nzb}kas ):
y6:
(z:3 B C A : {Nzb}kas ):
y7:
(z:4 B B A : {A; {Nzb}kas}kbs ):
y8:
(y:4 S C B : {A; {Nzb}kas}kbs ):
y9:
(y:5 S B B : {Nzb}kbs ):
y11:
(z:5 B C A : {Nzb}kbs ):
y12:
The trace given in Table 11 can be written as follows:
t =


1:1 B C A : A
1:2 B B A : N 1b
1:3 B C A : {N 1b }Kis
1:4 B B S : {A; {N 1b }Kis}Kbs
2:1 B C I : I
2:2 B B I : N 2b
2:3 B C I : {N 2b }Kis
2:4 B B S : {I; {N 1b }Kis}Kbs
3:4 S C B : {I; {N 1b }Kis}Kbs
3:5 S B B : {N 1b }Kbs
1:5 B C S : {N 1b }Kbs
Let us now prove that the trace t does not satisfy the authentication property. Notice
that a detailed proof can be done using the tableau-based semantics. In what follows,
we give only the basic steps of this proof.
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According to the rule R& the trace t satis.es the formula
$ ≡ &X (〈pb # #〉tt → 〈pasb # p−asb〉X )
if and only if the trace t satis.es the formula
$1 ≡ 〈pb # #〉tt → (〈pasb # p−asb〉)&X (〈pb # #〉tt → 〈pasb # p−asb〉X )
According to the de.nition of →, the trace t satis.es the formula $1 if and only if
the trace t does not satisfy the formula
$3 ≡ 〈pb # #〉tt
or the trace t satis.es the formula
$4 ≡ (〈pasb # p−asb〉)&X (〈pb # #〉tt → 〈pasb # p−asb〉X )
Let us .rst see whether the trace t satis.es or not the formula $3. Since there exists
a substitution
 = { x1 → #;
z → 1;
x2 → #;
x3 → #;
x4 → #;
x5 →


2:1 B C I : I
2:2 B B I : N 2b
2:3 B C I : {N 2b }Kis
2:4 B B S : {I; {N 1b }Kis}Kbs
3:4 S C B : {I; {N 1b }Kis}Kbs
3:5 S B B : {N 1b }Kbs
;
x6 → #
}
such that pb = t and since the trace # satis.es the formula tt, it follows that the trace
t satis.es the formula $3. Therefore, the trace t satis.es the formula $ if and only if t
satis.es the formula $4. Now, since there exists no substitution  ′ such that pasb ′= t,
we deduce that the trace t does not satisfy the formula $4. Finally, since the trace t
satis.es the formula $3 and t does not satisfy the formula $4, we conclude that t does
not satisfy the authentication property $, i.e. the trace t contains an authentication 2aw.
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9.2. Secrecy
Secrecy is the oldest and best studied aspect of security. We say that a protocol
preserves secrecy if it does not leak sensitive information during its execution such
as secret cryptographic keys. For instance, the following protocol does not warrant
the secrecy of the message m since the key used to encrypt m has been made public
information.
:1A → B : kab
:2B → A : {m}kab
The formalization of the secrecy property needs to take into consideration the intruder’s
initial knowledge. Informally, an intruder knows a message m, if this message can be
deduced using the initial knowledge of the intruder, its received messages and its usual
rules (encryption, decryption, concatenation, etc.). In this respect, we propose that the
intruder’s initial knowledge has to be added to the analyzed trace as virtual steps.
For instance, if the intruder knows the key kis, the step capturing this knowledge and
having to be added to the analyzed trace is the following:
: B I : kis
As a result, the secrecy property can be speci.ed in our logic as follows:
S(m) ≡¬K(m)
K(m)≡ &X:(〈x:( : B : m):y# #〉tt ∨
〈x:( : B : {x1}x2 ):y:( : B : x2):z#
x:( : B : x1):y:( : B : x2):z〉X ∨
〈x:( : B : x1):y:( : B : {x2}x1 ):z#
x:( : B : x1):y:( : B : x2):z〉X ∨
〈x:( : B : x1; x2):y# x:( : B : x1):( : B : x2):y〉X )
Notice that, for simplicity, we assume that the message m is atomic (not an encrypted
message or a concatenated message). However, it is possible to generalize the property
so as to capture the secrecy of composed messages. We assume also that the en-
crypted messages used within the analyzed trace are encrypted using atomic messages
(composed messages cannot be used as keys).
Intuitively, an intruder knows the message m if it receives this message in the
analyzed trace or in the modi.ed version of this trace:
• If the analyzed trace has the form of
x:( : B : {x1}x2 ):y:( : B : x2):z
278 K. Adi et al. / Theoretical Computer Science 291 (2003) 223–283
then it can be replaced by the following trace:
x:( : B : x1):y:( : B : x2):z
This transformation captures the fact that if the set of the intruder’s knowledge
contains the message {x1}x2 and the message x2, then the message {x1}x2 can be
replaced by x1.
• If the analyzed trace has the form of
x:( : B : x1; x2):y
then it can be replaced by the following trace:
x:( : B : x1):( : B : x2):y
This transformation captures the fact that if the set of the intruder’s knowledge
contains the message x1; x2, then this message can be replaced by x1 and x2.
9.3. Money atomicity
Recall that money atomicity in an electronic commerce protocol allows the transfer
of money without the possibility of destruction (debit without credit) or of creation
(credit without debit) of money. Let us consider the following protocol:
:1C → M : {CC;M; $V}kb
:2C → B : {CC;M; $V}kcb
:2Debit(B; CC; $V )
:3M → B : {CM; {CC;M; $V}kb ; $V}kmb
:3Credit(B; CM; $V )
In this protocol, C is the client, M is the merchant, B is the bank, CC is the client
account number, CM is the merchant account number and $V is the amount of money
to be transferred. This protocol is clearly not money atomic since the client account
could be debited without crediting the merchant account if the message 3 is not received
by the bank. As a result, this protocol could destroy money.
To simplify the speci.cation of the money atomicity property, we introduce some
auxiliary notation. Let {|a1; : : : ; an|} be a multiset of actions. We denote by ({|a1; : : : ;
an|}) the set of all possible permutations of the sequence a1; : : : ; an. Also, we use
+({|a1; : : : ; an|}) to denote the following set:
+({|a1; : : : ; an|}) =
⋃
p∈({|a1 ;:::;an|})
{p+}
For instance, if {|a1; : : : ; an|}= {|a; a; b|}, then
({|a; a; b|}) = {a:a:b; a:b:a; b:a:a}
+({|a; a; b|}) = {x1:a:x2:a:x3:b:x4; x5:a:x6:b:x7:a:x8; x9:b:x10:a:x11:a:x12}
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Intuitively, a protocol P keeps the multiset of actions {|a1; : : : ; an|} atomic if in any valid
execution of this protocol (any trace associated to this protocol), the presence of one
action ai ∈{|a1; : : : ; an|} involves the presence of all the other remaining actions. Fur-
thermore, if we remove, from this trace, one occurrence of each action in {|a1; : : : ; an|},
the reduced trace still satis.es the money atomicity. More formally, the money atom-
icity of a multiset {|a1; : : : ; an|}, denoted by MA({|a1; : : : ; an|}), is de.ned as follows:
MA({|a1; : : : ; an|})≡ &X: (
∨
a∈{a1 ;:::;an}〈x:a:x′# #〉tt→∨
p∈+({|a1 ;:::;an|})〈p#p−〉X
)
For instance, if {|a1; : : : ; an|}= {|a; b|}, then the money atomicity property is
&X: ((〈x:a:x′ # #〉tt ∨ 〈x:b:x′ # #〉tt)→
(〈x1:a:x2:b:x3 # x1:x2:x3〉X ∨ 〈x1:b:x2:a:x3 # x1:x2:x3〉X ))
Notice that the size of the formula MA({|a1; : : : ; an|}) is exponential in the number of
actions n. However, for real-life protocols atomicity properties do not usually involve
a large number of actions.
9.4. Good atomicity
Recall that good atomicity in an electronic commerce protocol precludes the pos-
sibility that a client pays without getting the corresponding goods, or gets the goods
without paying. Let us consider the following protocol:
:1C → M : {CC;M; $V}kb
:2M → B : {CM; {CC;M; $V}kb ; $V}kmb ;
:2Debit(CC; $V )
:2Credit(CM; $V )
:3M → C : Data
In this protocol, C is the client, M is the merchant, B is the bank, CC is the client
account number, CM is the merchant account number and Data corresponds to an
electronic good that the consumer has already paid for $V in Step 2. Obviously, this
protocol does not satisfy the good atomicity. Indeed, if Step 3 fails, then the customer
C will not receive the good for which he was already charged in Step 2.
This example illustrates the case where good atomicity is not satis.ed. Actually, to
get good atomicity enforced, the payment and delivery should occur within the same
protocol action. This is not a limitative consequence that is proper to our trace-based
model. It is rather the case in any realistic model that takes into consideration that
a protocol may stop at any point of its execution. For instance, a protocol in which
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payment and delivery span over many actions may accidently stop (e.g., the server of
the vendor crashes) or maliciously stop (e.g., the vendor is an intruder that decides
to not send the good to the client after receiving the payment) leading possibly to a
violation of good atomicity.
The speci.cation of the atomicity of a multiset of actions {|a1; : : : ; an|} related to
goods (good atomicity), denoted by GA({|a1; : : : ; an|}), is same to the money atomicity
property, as shown below.
GA({|a1; : : : ; an|})≡ &X: (
∨
a∈{a1 ;:::;an}〈x:a:x′# #〉tt→∨
p∈+({|a1 ;:::;an|})〈p#p−〉X
)
10. Conclusion
We have reported in this paper the de.nition of a new dynamic, linear and modal
logic for security protocols. The logic is compact, expressive and formal. It allows
the speci.cation of both classical security properties (authentication, secrecy and in-
tegrity) and electronic commerce properties (non-repudiation, anonymity, good atomic-
ity, money atomicity, certi.ed delivery, etc.). Hence, we have presented the syntactic
de.nition of the logic together with its underlying formal semantics. The logic con-
structs are interpreted over a trace-based model, where traces re2ect valid protocol
executions in the presence of a malicious smart intruder. The logic is endowed with a
tableau-based proof system leading to a natural modular (local) relativized denotational
semantics. The soundness, the completeness and the .niteness of the tableau proof sys-
tem have been discussed. Finally, the expressiveness of the proposed logic has been
shown by the speci.cation of many security properties.
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